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ABSTRACT: Espousing non-reductive physicalism, how do we pick out the specific relevant 
physical notion(s) from physical facts, specifically in relation to phenomenal experience? 
Beginning with a historical review of Gilbert Ryle’s behaviorism and moving through Hilary 
Putnam’s machine-state functionalism and Wilfrid Sellars’ inferential framework, up to more 
contemporaneous computationalist- and cognitivist-functionalism (Gualtiero Piccinini), we 
survey accounts of mentality that countenance the emergence of mental states vide input- and 
output-scheme. Ultimately arriving at the conclusion that functionalism cannot account for 
problems such as no-cognition reports, we see any robust defense of physicalism must appeal to 
other principles. Thus we move on to the question of emergence, not as it pertains to the hard(er) 
problem, but to the matter of conceptual externalization of mental properties from physical 
properties. Accordingly, we navigate Karen Bennett’s compatibilist solution to the exclusion 
argument against mental causation for the non-reductive physicalist position, according to which 
the physical effects of mental cases are not overdetermined, demonstrating that this backfires by 
offering a path for the mind-body interactionist Dualist to claim causal closure by appealing to 
this same schema. We conclude with a series of conceptual musings regarding rationality which 
take into account our challenges and findings, querying about whether phenomenal 
consciousness is a fundamentally private, or socially configured, notion. 
KEYWORDS: Philosophy of Mind; Epistemology; Machine-State functionalism; Kant; Wilfrid 
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The immediate consciousness of the existence of outer things i s not presupposed but 
proved in the preceding theorem, whether we have insight into the possibility of this 
consciousness or not. The question about the latter would be whether we have only an 
inner sense but no outer one, rather merely outer imagination. But it is clear that in 
order for us even to imagine something as external, i.e., to exhibit it to sense in intuition, 
we must already have an outer sense, and by this means immediately distinguish the 
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mere receptivity of an outer intuition from the spontaneity that characterizes every 
imagining. For even merely to imagine an outer sense would itself annihilate the faculty 
of intuition, which is to be determined through the imagination outer intuition from the 
spontaneity that characterizes every imagining. For even merely to imagine an outer 
sense would itself annihilate the faculty of intuition, which is to be determined through 
the imagination. 
—Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, B276-7. 
INTRODUCTION: EXCLUSION  
Reza Negarestani’s Intelligence and Spirit, multitudinous, variegated, ambitious, and 
a bit disheveled in its Hegelian-Carnapian synthesis, perhaps can be best 
summarized as attempting to provide a sundry methodology to consider how we 
might approach the rather awesome question: ought Intelligence, as it is 
collectively situated vide the Dasein of Geist—through linguistically licensed 
epistemic practices including the verification and articulation of knowledge and 
reasons—be considered as fundamentally private, subjective affair or is it 
inherently deprivatized? The latter position, which Negarestani espouses, implies 
that intelligence is structured not as any one property but a shared and distributed 
representation of a network of lower-level representations; the qualitative 
integration of self-consciousness or Geist transmogrifies mind itself into a 
cognitive artefact of intelligence. Semantically structured, the conclusion that 
Negarestani’s book offers is that the function of the mind that is “intelligence” is 
a semantically structured and negotiable concept, stilted on a logical space of 
reasons and, therefore, but an ossified model for thinking collective agency. In 
short, intelligence is but a socially distributed metaphor, imposing a boundary-
distinction between intelligence understood as the intractable organ of thought, 
and intelligibility—the concrete actualization of intelligence that renders the 
world and sapience thinkable.1 
This is a kind of understanding as intelligence as structuring-activity: thus, 
intelligence finds a critical node with the first instantiation of tool-use, reified and 
articulated in distinct terms with every novel technology thereafter, revealing the 
manifest world by rendering its scientific counterpart intelligible, modeling reality 
on the normativity of the space of reasons. Accordingly, structuration is then 
identified with conceptualization and objectivation: making-intelligible a reality 
 
1 Reza Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2018). 
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that is in itself neither functionally structured nor conceptually intelligible. At the 
same time, avowing the pertinence of AGI as the theoretical medium through 
which Geist is formalized, Negarestani reveals his Carnapian penchant. This 
proclivity is rather straightforward, as it deals with providing an external 
framework condition; privy to Carnap's project of descriptive semantics—the 
pragmatic use of propositions in making cognitive judgments in suitable 
perceptual or experimental contexts about localized individuals/particulars—
within non-formal domains, Negarestani’s Carnapian flank concedes that, when 
it comes to semantic externalism, verification empiricism can at best aspire to 
make cogent conceptual explication, where our conceptual explications, viz. 
explicandae, are in principle incomplete and thus revisable. Thus and so, our 
explications must clarify and improve upon their explicatae within their original 
contexts of use. Ineluctably, this invokes semantic and justificatory externalism. 
Tool use, semantics, artworks, ethics—when instantiated as particulars, these are 
all indexes of intelligence, if we adopt Negarestani’s framework.  
What of Hegel, who Negarestani often returns to? In the service of 
conceptualizing intelligence, Hegel's phenomenological method ineluctably 
involves positive conclusions, augmenting Kant's Critical account of rational 
judgement and justification. When capering alongside Hegel’s spirit, absolute 
contingency becomes equipollent to absolute necessity with the totality of form 
and any one-world system including the totality of every possibility whatsoever. 
This all much to Quine’s chagrin as Quine, wielding Russell’s pickaxe—that 
theory of descriptions meant to untangle the matted knots of Plato’s beard—warn 
us from inviting Hegel to dine; undoubtedly, Hegel’s invitation also means 
welcoming unactualized modal possibilities. For Hegel, actuality includes its 
opposite, actuality met with the conditions of possibility, attempting to actualize 
possibility, itself; the modal ramifications of substance expound via both actuality 
and possibility, with that which is unactualized embedded as conditions of 
possibility. The form of consciousness Hegel critiques as 'sense certainty' espouses 
naïve realism, with Hegel's phenomenological presentation highlighting those 
varieties of mediation involved in what sense-data-cum-sense-certainty purports 
as utterly immediate, and thus fallacious, knowledge. For those mediations that 
are conceptual and cognitive involve competent use of various concepts in 
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connection with sensed particulars.2 The inferential gambit of Negarestani’s 
Hegel is to serve at once as a suspicion towards commonsense knowledge of 
anything—although we do know how to and do indeed engage in sorting out and 
sequencing our experiences of various particulars and experiential episodes, this 
is not simply done through sensing. Notably, however, Negarestani’s uptake allots 
us something more akin to a Fregel,3 that mongrel-philosopher who so seeks to 
identify accurately sub-personal cognitive functions which must be sufficiently 
reliable so as to enable us to be semantically aware of our epistemic warrants.  
Let us, at this point, set Negarestani’s project aside but glean from it one 
guiding methodological question: can intentionality be deprivatized? In non-
formal domains, justification is not sufficient for provability and, vide Kant’s 
Transcendental Analytic and the Analogies of Experience, we recognize that 
non-formal reasoning requires semantic and existence postulates, none of which 
can be formulated, assessed, or justified by the formal techniques of logic alone. 
This paper, which begins by clarifying a historical survey within the philosophy 
of mind before moving on to engaging with inferentially-licensed machine-state 
functionalism and non-reductive physicalism, is guided by the aforementioned 
set of conceptual concerns. However, given our limitations at this time, our 
considerations shall be significantly more modest than those aforementioned 
philosophers. Thus, we shall not even entertain intelligence, a notoriously 
slippery concept, and the possibility of deprivatized intelligence—instead, we 
shall turn to the question of conscious and mental events. 
 
2 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), §238. 
3 That Hegel unspooled by Brandom, named Fregel, queries whether the alethic modal dependencies 
through which we conceptually track regularities in the regular descriptive order can be set to enjoy real 
counterparts in nature? What of modality, logical negation-based differences—is modality only applicable 
to the domain of cognizing or is the world conceptually and modally-differentially structured? If the latter 
obtains, how do we conceive of this difference? Negarestani points to interaction/cut-elimination by way of 
Jean-Yves Girard’s ludics. According to the inferential schema of ludics, contexts are cumulative in 
multiplicatives and shared in additives; negation (⊥) does not proffer the familiar role of “negating” but the 
role of a change of viewpoint. Negarestani’s project thus leaves the reader baffled as to how the writer did 
not consider to reinvite and naturalize deontological metaethics into this formal scheme, perhaps offering a 
formalized developmental rejoinder to the Categorical Imperative and, thereby, answering Filipa Foot’s 
charge re: the non-hypothetical use of “should,” of how a self-given law that is not a physical law like the 
law of gravity, i.e., a law of behavior, can be universalized vis-à-vis pure rationality. Filippa Foot, “Morality 
as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, The Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (1972): 305-16. 
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COMMITMENTS AND DESTINATIONS 
To approach this task we shall consider non-reductive supervenience 
physicalism. This meaning putting aside the metaphysical possibility of 
Davidson's token-physicalism and the consequent epiphenomenalism 
commitment, where mental processes are likened to smoke emanating from a 
locomotive. We grant that not only are mental processes significant insofar as 
phenomenological consciousness is concerned, but that they are causally 
efficacious, propelling the physical body forward. To lay bare our commitments, 
we presume that while phenomenal consciousness, or, per Ned Block's parlance, 
p-consciousness, is significant and that there is such a thing, it is compatible with 
the doctrine of physicalism. P-consciousness, we maintain, is separable from 
cognitive access. For instance, when observing a complex visual scene, we are 
phenomenally conscious of more than we can report. However, contra the “no-
report” paradigm, which separates the neural basis of cognitive processes 
underlying post-perceptual decisions and reports from the neural basis of 
conscious perception, we, commit to the fact that, even in the absence of 
reportability, subjects may engage in some post-perceptual cognitive processing. 
Thus, we commit to a no-cognition paradigm, as evidenced by empirical cases such 
as binocular rivalry.4 
Given no-cognition paradigms, we, more broadly, are committed to the 
possibility of totally inaccessible experiences, while also holding that 
neuroscience may, and most likely will, eventually support a theory on which the 
neural machinery that grounds (phenomenally) conscious experience is 
completely separable from the neural machinery that grounds cognitive access. 
As far as P-consciousness is concerned, there is something about our internal 
biological makeup, perhaps its electrochemical character, that is essential to 
conscious phenomenology. Thus, phenomenal experiences would, too, be 
separable from superficial functional organization, from externally determined 
 
4 “According to the prevailing account of rivalry, pools of neurons representing each of the incompatible 
stimuli inhibit one another. In the presence of neural noise, one pool wins temporarily. Then that pool is 
weakened by adaptation and the other pool representing the other alternative takes over. Because of the 
impact of neural noise, the time of the transitions cannot be predicted on the basis of past transitions. 
Binocular rivalry occurs in many animals, including fruit flies, and can occur in humans with invisible 
stimuli, showing that binocular rivalry is not intrinsically a conscious process.” Ned Block, “What Is Wrong 
with the No-Report Paradigm and How to Fix It,” Trends in the cognitive sciences 23, no. 12 (2019): 1004. 
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representational content, and from cognitive access, because they are constituted 
by internal biological states of the brain, and those biological states are separable 
from all those things. However, the possibility of this epistemic gap between those 
biological states in the brain and conscious experience does not commit us to an 
ontological gap. 
SETTING UP THE PLAYING FIELD 
Before dealing with the aforementioned conceptual matters, there is some need 
to Consider the possibility, as many philosophers have asked to consider, of a 
superficial functional isomorph of ourselves occupying another distant, possible 
world. This thought-experiment could be brought a bit closer to our actual 
reality, and thus our actual world, if, perhaps, we ask that we transpose this 
situation by way of teletransportation, as Derek Parfit asks to imagine in his 1984 
classic Reasons and Persons. While we do not yet possess such a technology, it is not 
terribly unfeasible to consider the possibility of such a development in the not-
too distant future. In Chapter 10 of Reasons and Persons, “What do We Believe 
Ourselves to Be?”, Parfit asks us to imagine our teletransportation to Mars—in 
this world, teletransportation is possible and the way in which it is done is that, 
when we wants to travel to Mars we step inside of a teletransportation device and 
press a green button. Accordingly, our body and brain are destroyed in the flash 
of an instant, we lose consciousness, and the exact state of all of our cells is 
recorded. This information is, simultaneously, sent via radio to Mars, and on 
Mars, a machine utilizes this information to create a brand new body and brain 
out of new, though apparently identical, matter. Hence, we, in our new albeit 
identical body on Mars, consider ourselves to be the identical person when we 
wake up: our memories are retained, we behave the same way, have the same 
tastes, desires, proclivities, etc. Because memories are retained, there is 
psychological continuity between me and my replica; because the physical make-
up is retained, there is physical continuity as well. 
Now, we are asked to imagine the same scenario where we do not go 
unconscious during the teletransportation process but the body and that our body 
stays on Earth while the same process of replication occurs; this time, however, it 
is a process of duplication. We, observing via camera, see this replica of ourselves 
on Mars, going about their day. Parfit notes that, most likely, we would, in this 
second scenario not consider this person to be an identity. The stakes could be 
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raised ever higher—consider that the operator of the teletransportor tells you that 
something has gone awfully wrong and you suffered terminable heart damage, 
although your replica is fully healthy and did not. Parfit remarks that: 
Since I can talk to my Replica, it seems clear that he is not me. Though he is exactly 
like me, he is one person, and I am another. When I pinch myself, he feels nothing. 
When I have my heart attack, he will again feel nothing. And when I am dead he 
will live for another forty years. If we believe that my Replica is not me, it is natural 
to assume that my prospect […] is almost as bad as ordinary death. I shall deny 
this assumption. As I shall argue later, I ought to regard having a Replica as being 
about as good as ordinary survival. I can best defend this claim, and the view that 
supports it, after briefly discussing part of the past debate about personal identity.5 
Thus opens the philosophical problem of a reductionist vs. non-reductionist 
view of personal identity. If we espouse the non-reductionist position, we are not 
satisfied with continuity by way of reducing identity to physical or psychological 
continuity—brains, bodies, and mental/physical events. For the non-
reductionist, despite physical replication, some further fact needs to account for 
personal identity. According to the non-reductionist’s view, personal identity over 
time does not simply consist in physical and/or psychological continuity and, 
thus, the non-reductionist searches for some further fact—a further fact which 
states that the criterion for personal identity is a separate entity or property that 
exists apart from the body and brain. Could this further fact incorrigibly appeal 
to something like “personal identity”? 
In The Conscious Mind (1996), David Chalmers remarks that “[t]here is a strong 
intuition that there must always be a fact of the matter about personal identity: if 
there are numerous minds descending from my current state, there must be a fact 
about which one of them will be me.”6 This idea is precisely what Parfit criticizes, 
arguing persuasively that there is nothing more to the fact of personal identity 
than facts such as psychological continuity, memory, and the like. If we accept 
Parfit’s analysis, then each of “tomorrow's minds,” so to speak, are equal 
candidates to count as me, and there is no fact to distinguish them. In turn, the 
determinate “flow” of personal identity is but an illusion. 
 
5 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 180. 
6 David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 352. 
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RYLE: ANALYTICAL BEHAVIORISM 
Now, say that in this process of teletransportation, my replica is reconstructed not 
in Mars but in a planet that is analogous to Earth, perhaps Earth2. Consider, 
furthermore, that on Earth2, my reconstructed self has a different chemical 
basis—perhaps silicon instead of organic carbon. This is a thought experiment 
that Ned Block asks us imagine, considering Commander Data from Star Trek: 
Let us think of Commander Data as defined as a merely superficial functional 
isomorph of us. A superficial isomorph of us is isomorphic to us in causal relations 
among [its] states, inputs, and outputs to the extent that those causal relations are 
part of commonsense psychology. That is, for every human mental state, input, and 
output, there is a corresponding state, input, and output of Commander Data; and 
for every causal relation among our states, inputs, and outputs, there is a 
corresponding causal relation among Commander Data’s mental states, inputs, and 
outputs. One consequence is that Commander Data will behave just as we do, as 
far as we can tell from the standpoint of commonsense psychology. I said that 
Commander Data is a merely superficial isomorph of us. That means that he is not 
like us in physical realization of the superficial functional states. … We might 
suppose just to get an example on the table that the physical basis of Commander 
Data’s brain is to be found in etched silicon chips rather than the organic carbon 
basis of our brains … We have no conception of a ground of rational belief that 
Commander Data is or is not conscious.7 
Commander Data and the Earth2 Replica are superficial functional 
isomorphs. Functionalism, in both cases, allows for us to contend with the 
Multiple Realizability of mental states. Consider that Commander Data and the 
Replica can both feel pain when reacting to bodily damage; how might we know 
this? We see that, perhaps, both of them wince when they bump their head 
against a sharp object, or perhaps they both curse aloud, reporting that they are 
in pain while doing so. Given the network of pain-behavior, this scheme localizes 
pain as the center fulcrum; functionalism finds pain as satisfying the causal role 
of pain-behavior.  
Functionalism has its early genealogical roots partially in behaviorism; 
according to the behaviorist, intelligence is the propensity to do or behave a certain 
way, given some set of appropriate circumstances. For soft-behaviorists like 
 
7 Ned Block, Consciousness, Function, and Representation Collected Papers Volume I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2007) 9, 407, 414; [hereafter: CFR I].  
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Gilbert Ryle, for instance, mental statements can be understood and made 
identical to a series of dispositional statements. Specifically, Ryle's position can 
be termed analytical behaviorism, which often is considered to be equivalent to 
logical behaviorism (albeit Ryle, alongside Wittgenstein, would be more aptly 
considered as a predecessor to logical behaviorism, proper) according to which 
sentences concerning mentality can be translated, without any lossage, into 
sentences about observable behavior. According to Ryle, Hume put forward a 
fallacious causal theory that one could not have a particular “idea” without 
having previously having had a corresponding sensation; this is, for Ryle, 
evidenced by Hume’s so-called riddle of induction: 
[Hume] put forward the causal theory that one could not have a particular ‘idea’ 
without having previously had a corresponding sensation, somewhat as having an 
angular bruise involves having been previously struck by an angular object. The 
colors that I see in my mind’s eye are, he seems to have thought, traces somehow 
left by the colors previously seen by me with my eyes open. The only thing that is 
true in this account is that what I see in my mind’s eye and what I hear ‘in my head’ 
is tied in certain ways to what I have previously seen and heard. But the nature of 
this tie is not at all what Hume supposed.8 
Ultimately, for Ryle, causal theories prove inadequate, with the former 
identified by Hume and the problem of induction. For, following the problem of 
induction via Hume, we experience and identify physical objects, though we 
cannot know laws governing their behavior. Though distinct, the issues of whether 
or how we identify physical objects or events, and of whether or how we identify 
laws governing their behavior, are correlative problems requiring conjoint 
solution—we can only identify physical objects and, likewise, spatio-temporal 
events, as objective successions by discriminating regularities in their behavior; 
such regularities are discerned by way of their being at least partly manifest to us 
by way of how they appear to us—that is, by distinguishing their regularities from 
those regularities in their appearances which depend upon our own chosen 
courses of action.9 Indeed, causal relations between our surroundings and our 
sensory ideas simply do not suffice for explaining how those ideas refer to and can 
represent objects in our surroundings.  
 
8 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 247. 
9 C.I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1929), 320. 
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Ryle underscores this in the aforementioned example; contra Hume, for Ryle 
“[t]he only thing that is true in this account is that what I see in my mind’s eye 
and what I hear ‘in my head’ is tied in certain ways to what I have previously 
seen and heard.”10 For Ryle, mock-actions necessarily presuppose “ingenuous 
actions, in the sense that performing the former involves, in a special sense, the 
thought of the latter.”11 In turn, a person who has never seen how blue things look 
could not see blue things in the mind's eye (that is, they could not picture blue 
things in his mind's eye or recognize blue things). Thus “we learn how things look 
and sound chiefly and originally by seeing and hearing them.”12 Imaging, as a 
way of utilizing knowledge amongst many, requires the relevant knowledge has 
been acquired, in similar fashion. Knowledge-acquisition described as such, with 
it being tethered to knowledge-utilization—and thus the functional scheme writ 
large—demonstrates Ryle's behaviorist predilection. In this example, Ryle states 
that we no longer need Hume's “para-mechanical theory of traces” and all that 
is required for learning qua picture-thinking are those perceptual lessons which 
“entails some perceiving, that applying those lessons entails having learned them, 
and that imaging is one way of applying those lesson.”13  
Given Ryle’s account, however, we have to contend with examples such as the 
following: the frame of mind of some person who is merely pretending to be 
upset, and how this is different from that of a person who genuinely is cross. For 
Ryle, the former’s simulation involves, in some way, the “thought” of crossness. 
More broadly, the business of trying or simulating to behave/behavior in ways in 
which a cross person would behave is itself, at least partially, making functional 
use of the thought of how the person would behave were they genuinely cross. 
That is, they are using “being cross” as a prop, comporting a more or less faithful 
muscular representation of the cross man or woman’s poutings and stampings, 
thus proffering the active utilization of the knowledge of how the cross man 
would, if genuinely cross, behave.14  
Thus, for Ryle, there is not much between a child playing at being a pirate 
 
10 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 247. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 238-9. 
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and one fancying that he is a pirate. Truly, the difference is merely linguistic, 
tethered to our using words. However, underlying this is perhaps a more radical 
difference which engages with picture-thinking, a difference that occurs when 
and by way of the fact that we apply the words “pretend,” “simulate” and “act 
the part,” where an overt and muscular representation is given of whatever deed 
or condition is being “put on” while we imagine/fancy for those behaviors of 
mental states that are “in their heads.”15. This brand of make-belief is what Ryle 
terms “imagining,” “visualizing,” “mind's eyes,” and “going through in one's 
head.” More important than getting rid of the superstition that picturing 
something is seeing a picture of it in one's “mind's eye” is the claim that 
epistemologists of Ryle day had, up to that point, long encouraged, asking us “us 
to suppose [...] that a mental picture, or a visual image, stands to a visual 
sensation in something like the relation of an echo to a noise.”16  
It was claimed by those espousing this stripe of epistemology that it is the case 
that what is occurring when I “hear,” “smell,” “see” corresponds something 
mental to that (bodily) element in perceiving. As we shall soon return, this was 
later embedded into Wilfrid Sellars' Myth of the Given. Consequently, Ryle 
considers that perceiving entails both having sensations and something else—i.e., 
thinking. Ryle details how imaging is not a function of pure sentence, or merely 
linguistic, and requires learning; what makes the imaginative operation of going 
through a song in one's head similar to following a heard song/rehearsing the 
song is in exercising humming it or playing it:  
Going through a tune in one’s head is like following a heard tune and is, indeed, a 
sort of rehearsal of it. But what makes the imaginative operation similar to the other 
is not, as is often supposed, that it incorporates the hearing of ghosts of notes similar 
in all but loudness to the heard notes of the real tune, but the fact that both are 
utilizations of knowledge of how the tune goes. This knowledge is exercised in 
recognizing and following the tune, when actually heard; it is exercised in humming 
or playing it; in noticing the errors in its midperformance; it is also exercised in 
fancying oneself humming or playing it and in fancying oneself merely listening to 
it. Knowing a tune just is being able to do some such things as recognize and follow 
it, produce it, detect errors in the playing of it and go through it in one’s head. We 
should not allow that a person had been unable to think how the tune went, who 
 
15 Ibid., 241. 
16 Ibid. 
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had whistled it correctly or gone through it in his head. Doing such things is 
thinking how the tune goes [....] We might say that imagining oneself talking or 
humming is a series of abstentions from producing the noises which would be the 
due words or notes to produce, if one were talking or humming aloud. That is why 
such operations are impenetrably secret; not that the words or notes are being 
produced in a hermetic cell, but that the operations consist of abstentions from 
producing them. That, too, is why learning to fancy one is talking or humming 
comes later than learning to talk or hum. Silent soliloquy is a flow of pregnant non-
sayings. Refraining from saying things, of course, entails knowing both what one 
would have said and how one would have said it.17 
For Ryle, to consider minds and bodies as distinct from one another—as he 
claimed dualists did—commits to a category mistake. Cartesianism, according to 
Ryle, implies there is some vague abyss-like and insurmountable epistemic gap 
between knowledge of one's mind and the knowledge of other minds. However, 
despite the analytical behaviorist doctrine with which he is identified, Ryle is by 
no means agonistic about ontological behaviorism, as he considers behaviors, 
themselves, to be embedded, and thus intrinsic, with the mind/mentality. As Ryle 
notes, “[t]o talk of a person’s mind is not to talk of a repository which is permitted 
to house objects that something called ‘the physical world’ is forbidden to house; 
it is to talk of the person’s abilities, liabilities and inclinations to do and undergo 
certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the 
ordinary world.”18 While Ryle articulates his theory on mentality in terms of “talk 
about minds,” it is clear that Ryle's position is that a mind is nothing but 
dispositions and behaviors, and nothing more than this. 
While Ryle is mostly silent about specific mental occurrences , we do have 
some indication to his position regarding them by way of his remarks on “heed 
concepts,” which apparently (and ambiguously) apply to mental occurrences 
where one may be in some apparently “heedful” state of mind with respect to 
behavior; to be in such a “heedful” state of mind seemingly means to be in said 
state without actually engaging in that behavior: 
‘heed concepts’ […] refer to the concepts of noticing, taking care, attending, 
applying one’s mind, concentrating, putting one’s heart into something, thinking 
what one is doing, alertness, interest, intentness, studying and trying. ‘Absence of 
 
17 Ibid., 244-5. 
18 Ibid., 199. 
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mind’ is a phrase sometimes used to signify a condition in which people act or react 
without heeding what they are doing, or without noticing what is going on.19  
Thinking or heeding what one is doing does not entail constantly or recurrently 
making intelligent prose moves. On the contrary, making intelligent prose moves is 
just one example among others of thinking or heeding what one is doing, since it is 
saying things, thinking what one is saying. It is one species, not the causal condition 
of heedful performance. But certainly didactic telling, intelligently given and 
intelligently received, is often an indispensable guide to execution.20 
Despite the ambiguities and lack of precision, “heeding” may perhaps be 
better understood as a dispositional state, using more contemporary parlance. It 
also seems to be of an episodic nature: 
So while we are certainly saying something dispositional in applying such a heed 
concept to a person, we are certainly also saying something episodic. We are saying 
that he did what he did in a specific frame of mind, and while the specification of 
the frame of mind requires mention of ways in which he was able, ready or likely 
to act and react, his acting in that frame of mind was itself a clockable occurrence.21 
In speaking of “frames of mind,” Ryle’s refers to those dispositional states that 
are “unlike motives, but like maladies and states of the weather, temporary 
conditions which in a certain way collect occurrences, but they are not themselves 
extra occurrences.”22 Ryle does not grant these “frames of mind” much 
significance in terms of intentionality, as he deems them temporary conditions, 
something akin to a short-term mental disposition that does not overdetermine 
(physical) causation, functionally speaking—that is, speaking in terms of 
mereological relations, there is no macrophysical higher level that emerges from 
the microphysical lower level that results in novelty, the kind of qualitative change 
in behavior that occurs above some “critical value” of a parameter.23 Indeed, as 
 
19 Ibid., 118-9. 
20 Ibid., 126. 
21 Ibid., 140. 
22 Ibid., 83. 
23 “An emergent property, for Wimsatt, is a property of a system which is dependent on the mode of 
organization of the system's parts, how they are aggregated into the whole. Properties which are invariant 
against (small) changes in the modes of aggregation are non-emergent. In order for a system property P to 
count as emergent, P has to violate some or all of the following conditions of aggregativity:  
P is invariant under rearrangements of parts of the system or replacements with ‘relevantly equivalent’ parts;  
(ii) P is “qualitatively similar” to the property exhibited by the system when parts are added or subtracted;  
(iii) P is invariant under decomposition and reaggregation of parts;  
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Laird Addis underscore, ontologically speaking, Ryle’s “frames of mind” can be 
but nothing but short-term dispositions, however much, as we have seen Ryle 
attempts to at times avoid committing to this (or any) prescriptive theory of 
consciousness and the mental occurrences that make it up.24  
Perhaps, had Ryle combined his conception of “headedness” with the 
aforementioned description of aping “crossness” he would have arrived at 
something akin to Kendall Walton’s notion of “quasi-emotions,” or emotions that 
elicit an isomorph to genuine emotions but do not stipulate the genuine belief-
and-behavior pairing that genuine emotions do.25 There is, however, a more 
significant problem with Ryle’s conception of behavior and, more importantly, 
behaviorism writ large. Behaviorism, in identifying mental events/experiences as 
nothing beyond behavior, requires universalizing “if-then” type statements. In 
the case of pain, for instance, behaviorism stipulates that: “if you are in pain, then 
you will report it.” Consider the possibility of a person who is in pain who cannot 
report it—they cannot wince, exclaim “ouch!” or lift their arm to relieve their 
pain. The behaviorist has no legitimate means of attributing such a person pain 
and would simply have to deny the possibility of experiencing pain for such a 
person. However, such people who cannot behaviorally report/communicate 
pain do exist, as in the example of selectively deafferented patients who are 
afflicted with pseudocoma-type “locked-in syndrome.” These people cannot 
move, and sometimes cannot speak, but are fully conscious. Perhaps the 
behaviorist would rejoinder with a revised conditional account of dispositions 
that attempts at alleviating this burden where “if one has the ability to report 
their pain, then they will do so.” For the behaviorist, what grounds or supervenes 
realized behaviors/dispositions or reports is unaccounted for. 
 
(iv) there are no ‘cooperative or inhibitory interactions” involving P among the parts of the system.’ 
Alexander Rueger, “Physical Emergence, Diachronic and Synchronic,” Synthese 125, no. 3 (2000): 304. 
William C. Wimsatt, “Reductionism, levels of organization, and the mind-body problem” in Consciousness 
and the Brain, ed. Gordon G. Globus (New York: Plenum Press, 1976), 205-67. 
24 Laird Addis, “Ryle and Intentionality,” Metaphysica 10, no. 1 (2009): 60. 
25 E.g., “quasi-fear” can be experienced when watching a horror film, where one does not believe they are 
truly in danger and thus does not run out of the movie theater to avoid being murdered by the Leatherface 
when watching Texan Chainsaw Massacre. Kendall Walton, “Fearing Fictions,” Journal of Philosophy 75 
(1978): 5–27. 
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FREGE & KANT 
Having carved an early ancestor vide behaviorism, and seen its weaknesses, let 
us now turn to functionalism proper, which has a multitudinous and variegated 
history; where relevant, let us also mine the relationship between functionalism 
and inferentialism, with an interest in the role of the particular. Specifically, we 
will consider Frege, Putnam and Sellars, with a bricolage carved between the first 
and last via the role played by inferential capacities.  
Metaphysically situated, functionalism generally understood to also have an 
ancestor in Aristotle’s teleological conception of final causation, according to 
which every substance in nature is considered to be conceptualizable in terms of 
that which realizes and “brings out” their proper essence. This would mean that 
a knife is not (essentially) composed of metal but, instead, by a set of functional 
capacities. These capacities specify the purposes for which the knife is used by 
way of which the knife realizes its proper role, thus revealing its essence.  
Frege can be considered an early thinker of functionalism as functionalism 
pertains to the philosophy of language. According to Frege’s conceptualization of 
functionalism, there is a fundamental and primary conceptual-ontological 
distinction between a function and an object. Specifically, Frege considered how 
concepts are functions of a particular type; for Frege, truth values are simply 
objects and “[a] concept is a function whose value is always a truth value.”26 This 
means that nominalizations that invoke objects also invoke functions. The 
generalization of functional analysis would, herewith, also extend to 
propositional calculus, where predicates and logical connectives were represented 
as linguistic functions, with names as their arguments, and denoting truth-values 
as their abstract referents. Frege's conception that objective representation is 
conceived of at the intellectual level and emphasizes the publicity and 
intersubjectivity of language, wherefore propositional content needs to be 
conceived of vide patterns of inference, thus problematizing subjectivistic 
methods of sense-data infallibilism and atomistic premises of representation. In 
both language and perception, Frege theorizes of the referent as distinct from the 
 
26 Gottlob Frege, “Function and Concept” in Properties, ed. D.H. Mellor and Alex Oliver (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 139. 
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mode of presentation.27 Frege thus offers a disjunctivist lesson critical to —that 
there is never any specific perceptual-state kind that is commonly held between 
a perception of an object and a perception of another object; as Tyler Burge 
notes: 
Given that duplicates and illusions could make a belief false–wherever there are 
logically distinct events of reference—there is pressure to recognize different 
representational contents for different applications, even in the case of tracking that 
is actually successful. Where there are such possibilities, psychology will need to 
explain how successful tracking succeeds. To account for possible differences in 
veridicality among cases of contextually indiscernible duplicate switching and 
contextually indiscernible perceptual illusion, one must distinguish actual 
occurrences of context-dependent singular elements. These facts are probably the 
main defensible impetus for disjunctivist views. The representational contents of 
beliefs and perceptions involving true identities, duplicates, and illusions differ.28 
Frege’s distinction of presentation from referent here recalls Kant, as Frege 
and Kant both addresses issues of judgment where propositions alone are 
insufficient for epistemology. Before Frege, Kant had mapped conceptual 
explication, arguing on primarily epistemological grounds that the formal and a 
priori necessary conditions for the possibility of human apperception are far 
richer than the British empiricists had previously supposed. Kant’s inventory of 
our cognitive capacities in the Critique of  Pure Reason enables us to use concepts, 
principles and judgments cognitively. This is made particularly clear in Kant’s 
Refutation of Idealism: Kant's critical commonsense realism about moral 
particulars perceived in our environs is mapped onto semantics of singular, 
specifically cognitive reference, which is required for experience or knowledge in 
any non-formal domain, such as that of spatio-temporal particulars.29 Kant’s 
thesis regarding the sensory manifold is that unless the contents of one’s sensations 
have some minimum and recognizable degree of regularity and variety, 
perceptual synthesis does not obtain and, in turn, we cannot have the basis for 
what Kenneth Westphal aptly terms “cognitive judgments,” using a priori or 
 
27 Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Reference” (1892), in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 
eds. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966). 
28 Tyler Burge, “Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology,” Philosophical Topics 33, no. 1 (2005): 34. 
29 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), B275. 
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empirical concepts.  
This ‘affinity’ (associability) of the sensory manifold is transcendental because a 
priori it is a necessary condition of possible apperceptive (self-conscious) human 
experience (of oneself as being aware of some appearances appearing to occur 
before, during or after others).17 It is formal because it concerns the orderliness and 
orderability of the contents of sensations. However, ultimately it is satisfied neither 
by the a priori intuitive conditions of experience (spatiality and temporality as forms 
of our sensory receptivity) nor by the a priori conceptual conditions of cognitive 
judgment. Its satisfaction is due to the ‘content’ or the ‘object’ of experience.30 
Kant's semantics provides excellent grounds for rejecting verificationist 
theories of meaning, whilst insuring that genuine cognitive claims about 
particulars require locating them within time and space—Kant refutes the 
transcendent cognitive pretensions of rationalism, knowledge by acquaintance, 
descriptions theories of reference, and deductivist models of justification within 
empirical domains. Thus, Kant proves the cognitive irrelevance of merely logical 
possibilities to the justificatory status of empirical claims (i.e., fallibilism).31 For 
Frege, sentential meaning, truth, error or approximation each requires reference 
to at least one relevant, extant particular. Such reference is not specified or 
secured by sentence meaning (intension) alone—furthermore, concepts and 
objects are not representations, but different types of things that our expressions 
refer to. 
Accordingly, following Frege’s conception, sensory capacities cannot in 
themselves represent aspects of the physical world. The representation of the 
objective physical environment is attainable only through the grasp of 
propositional structures. Consequently, it is attainable solely through a capacity 
for judgment. Just as perception separated from thought would not suffice for 
judgment, objective and shareable representation means that perception requires 
some supplementation from propositional judgment in order to achieve 
representation of an objective world. Frege's point that inferential capacities 
determine the logical forms of sentences and of the propositional contents of 
representational states. The detour through Frege (qua Kant’s cognitive 
semantics) will prove highly relevant when we come to Sellars. 
 
30 Kenneth Westphal, Kant’s Critical Epistemology: Why Epistemology Must Consider Judgment First (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2020), §4: 35. Kant, CPR, A112–3, A653–4/B681–2. 
31 Westphal, Kant’s Critical Epistemology, §15: 85. 
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MULTIPLE REALIZIBILITY & MACHINE-STATE FUNCTIONALISM 
As it pertains to the philosophy of mind, functionalism can be traced to Aristotle’s 
Book II of De Anima, in which “the soul” is defined by what allows it to survive 
and flourish as a perceptual, rational living being. More recently, is in the work 
of Putnam and Sellars where functionalism emerges as the viable alternative to 
the dominating phenomenalist, empiricist, and behaviorist accounts of cognition 
that reigned supreme. Cognitive functionalism, specifically, sets up a scenario 
where mental states are understood as impossible to be adequately and 
thoroughly characterized in terms of intrinsic identity-properties or purely in 
terms of overt behavior. We have already seen that the shortcomings of 
behaviorism, but identity-theory is what forced functionalists like Putnam and 
Sellars to move beyond externally demonstrated or reported behaviors. 
One of those dominant accounts was the mind-brain identity theory where 
phenomenal concept such as pain is deemed equivalent to a material concept 
such as nociceptive-specific neuronal activity; as a type-b, or a posteriori, type of 
physicalism, mind-brain identity theory can be articulated in two modes, where 
the “identity” is construed as obtaining either between mental and physical types, 
or, when formulated more weakly, the identity obtains between mental and 
physical tokes. The former can be found in J.J.C. Smart’s 1959 paper “Sensations 
and Brain Processes,” which sought to polemicize behaviorism.32 Smart argues 
for a novel reduction of the mind contra behaviorism, stating that mental states 
(e.g., pain) and phenomenal experiences (e.g., experiencing the rose’s redness for 
the first time) can be identified with brain-states. Thus, Smart offers the “Brain 
Process Identity-thesis,” according to which “so far as a sensation statement is a 
report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are 
nothing over and above brain processes.”33  
Notably, Smart, wielding Occam’s razor, lays claim to “identity” as 
equipollent to the intractable “is” of type-equivalency. For Smart, if mental states 
can truly be enumerated in terms of physical brain states, then to admit “the 
mental” as anything conceptually “over and above” a physical state would be 
unnecessary and, in turn, violate Occam’s razor. This is not equipollent to 
eliminative materialism, as where Patricia Churchland would ask of us to 
 
32 J.J.C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” The Philosophical Review 68, no. 2 (1959), 141-156. 
33 Ibid., 145; [emphasis added]. 
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expunge the folk-psychological term “pain” altogether, Smart merely retains it as 
descriptively and causally useful:  
I say that the publicly observable physical object lightning is in fact the electric 
discharge, not just a correlate of it. The sense-datum, or at least the having of the 
sense-datum, the “look” of lightning, may well in my view be a correlate of the 
electric discharge. For in my view it is a brain state caused by the lightning. But we 
should no more confuse sensations of lightning with lightning than we confuse 
sensations of a table with the table.34 
In reference to afterimages, Smart remarks: 
When a person says ‘I see a yellowish-orange after-image’ he is saying something 
like this: “There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes 
open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me”35 
Indeed, not all mental states are associated with characteristic behaviors. 
Such after-images, being phenomenally qualitative, are not and cannot be 
reliably associated with any statistically reliable characteristic behaviorist scheme; 
while Smart thinks the dualist may have the impulse to offer these afterimages as 
something fundamentally immaterial, he thinks we ought to, donning the type-
B/a posteriori physicalist’s cap, see these as equivalent to nothing more than 
brain processes/neural activity.36 Rather than considering the afterimage as 
committing us to irreducibly mental conceptual states, Smart considers the way 
such physical states are described as articulated via ‘‘topic-neutral words,’’ which 
specify mental states in terms of the stimuli that causally bring them about them. 
D.M. Armstrong offers a more rigorous uptake of topic-neutrality by way of 
logical dependence, remedying Ryle in considering the role of purpose and its 
causal role re: perception and belief, with topic-neutral analyses meaningfully 
considered for the sake of mind-brain theory.37 Perhaps the most persuasive 
 
34 Ibid., 147. 
35 Ibid., 149. 
36 A neurosurgeon can, accordingly, observe the brain with an FMRI and “see” the experience of pain. The 
mind-brain identity theorist may offer that just as science has revealed lightning as electrical discharge and 
nothing more, water is, similarly, nothing more than H20. Similarly, science will reveal that yellowish-
orange after-images and other phenomenal mental states and experiences are nothing more than brain 
states. 
37 “The logical dependence of purpose on perception and belief, and of perception.” D.M. Armstrong, ‘‘The 
Causal Theory of the Mind.’’ in Neue Heft für Philosophie 11 (1977): 88; A materialist theory of mind (London: 
Routledge, 1968). 
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physicalist manifestation of the mind-brain theory finds its articulation in David 
Lewis who, recalling his formulation, notes: 
A dozen years or so ago, D. M. Armstrong and I (independently) proposed a 
materialist theory of mind that joins claims of type-type psychophysical identity 
with a behaviorist or functionalist way of characterizing mental states such as pain 
[....] Positing no ambiguity without independent reason, it provides natural senses 
in which both madman and Martian are in pain [....] Our view is that the concept 
of pain, or indeed of any other experience or mental state, is the concept of a state 
that occupies a certain causal role, a state with certain typical causes and effects. It 
is the concept of a state apt for being caused by certain stimuli and apt for causing 
certain behavior.38 
So follows Lewis’s deductive argument for a physicalist formulation of 
functionalist, which begins from the scheme of functionalism to the truth of 
physicalism by way of identity vide some ‘‘functional specification’’ version of 
functionalism. Pain is a functionally specified state, perhaps a functionally 
specified brain state, according to this description, where: 
1) Pain is demonstrated, via conceptual analysis, to occupy some causal role R.  
2) A certain neural state will be found to be the occupant for causal role R. 
3) Pain = this neural state.  
Following this description, functionalism demonstrates that the meaning of 
“pain” is the same as a particular and definite description that spells out the 
causal role R.39 Armstrong considered how pain and other mental states must be 
adequately apt for being caused in certain ways by physical stimuli plus other 
mental states, and thereby apt for combining with other mental states to jointly 
cause certain behavior. Such a mental state, like pain, is understood as the 
concept of a member of a system of states that together realize a pattern of causal 
generalizations that are pooled together to formulate some term traded in 
commonsense psychology, like pain. The true edge that Armstrong’s conception 
has, however, is that the concept of pain is understood as the concept of a state 
that occupies a certain causal role, where whatever that state does occupies the 
role that is pain. 
 
38 David Lewis, ‘‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain.’’ in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology Vol. 1, ed. Ned 
Block, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 217-8.  
39 Ned Block, “What is Functionalism” in CFR I, 38. 
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Unlike Armstrong, Putnam and Fodor would argue from functionalism to the 
falsity of physicalism. Despite the two would identify that there are functional 
states/functional properties), and that mental states/properties) are identical to 
these functional states/properties, for Putnam and Fodor, no functional state 
could be reduced to a physical state. But Putnam’s formulation of machine-state 
functionalism arguably I smore interesting that this fallacious argument against 
physicalism. Putnam’s prolific paper, “The Nature of Mental States,”40 was poised 
against behaviorism and gave the example of so-called Super-Spartans; Putnam 
argued, against those like Ryle, that someone may stifle one's pain-behavior, 
possibly to such a degree that one is not even inclined to reveal it. The argument 
is that behaviorism cannot account for all mental states, and it leaves out a crucial 
aspect of the mind, namely, our ability to experience our mental states from a 
first-person point of view.  
Putnam’s “Psychological Predicates” offers the thesis of Multiple 
Realizability.41 Consequently, the question that any fully-formed functionalism 
after Putnam’s paper must be able to answer is, thus, how to characterize the roles 
that define the intentionality of mental states and their articulation in a cognitive 
system. All mental states are intentional if these mental states are about or in some 
sense correlate to representations, including objects in the world.42 In this regard, 
in its modern origins, Putnam’s “machine-state” functionalism engages with the 
query of whether all mental states are representational: machine-state 
 
40 Hilary Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States” in Philosophical Papers, Vol. II (Cambridge, MA: 1975), 429-
441.  
41 Hilary Putnam 1967, “Psychological Predicates”, Art, Mind, and Religion, ed. W.H. Capitan and D.D. 
Merrill (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,1967), 37–48. If, as identity theory states, my experience 
of pain is equivalent to activity in area p in my brain, then there cannot be activity in area p without pain 
and there cannot be pain without activity in area p, for that is what “identity” in this context means. Thus, 
if the octopus brain contains nothing that resembles area p, the identity theorists would need to conclude 
that, octopi are unable to feel painful stimuli. Multiple Realizability offers that pain can have different 
neural signatures in different species, whether it be octopi or superficial functional isomorph-androids. 
Multiple Realization is not permitted on Smart's identity theory, as neural signature of pain shows up 
differently in different species, but when the neuroscientific account is complete, we will find that so-called 
different neural states are structurally similar enough to count as the same kind of state. 
42 G.E.M. Anscombe divides intentional states into two groups: 
1) intentional states such as hopes and desires have what is referred to as a “world-to-mind direction of fit”;  
2) beliefs and perceptions, which aim to represent the world as it actually is; beliefs and perceptions have a 
“mind-to-world direction of fit.”  
G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 1957), §§29–32, 51–7. 
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functionalism appears in the wake of computationalist approaches to the study of 
cognition, treating the mind as a probabilistic automaton whose operations could 
be understood in analogy with a Turing machine.  
Putnam's functionalism models the mind on Turing machines, specifically a 
Probabilistic Automaton that has been generalized to allow for “sensory inputs” 
and “motor outputs.” This Machine Table specifies, with every possible 
combination of a “state1 and a complete set of sensory inputs,” an “instruction” 
that determines the probability of the next state, and accordingly the probabilities 
of “motor outputs.”43 Unlike behaviorism, Putnam’s cognitive functionalist 
schema works by way of “transition properties” given by this Machine Table. As 
Putnam writes:  
The difficulties with 'behavior disposition' accounts are so well known that I shall 
do little more than recall them here. The difficulty - it appears to be more than a ' 
difficulty,' in fact - of specifying the required behavior disposition except as 'the 
disposition of X to behave as if X were in pain’ is the chief one, of course. In contrast, 
we can specify the functional state with which we propose to identify pain, at least 
roughly, without using the notion of pain. Namely, the functional state we have in 
mind is the state of receiving sensory inputs which play a certain role in the 
Functional Organization of the organism.44  
For the behavior-disposition theorist, not only are sensory inputs relevant, the 
Total State is relevant (thus, other values, beliefs, etc. enter into the Machine 
Table) and, in turn, Putnam notes that “it seems hopeless to make any general 
statement about how an organism in such a condition must behave; but this does 
not mean that we must abandon hope of characterizing the condition.”45 Such 
functionalist accounts provide a theory that seeks to establish formal 
isomorphism between the states of two systems, that preserves the relevant 
functional relations.46 Putnam, in a lecture titled “The Transcendence of Reason” 
articulates the question of machine-state functionalism by way of the continuities 
 
43 Hilary Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States” in Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 434. 
44 Ibid., 438. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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in our functional construction, asking if they play a role in our behavior while 
identifying behavior within a discrete set of functional possibilities: 
[…] let me take up [of] whether we are computing machines or, in the more 
technical sense, Turing Machines. There is the question whether we are a 
functional organization […] some digital machine, and there is then the question, 
whether we can be simulated by Turing Machines. Can we do anything machines 
can't? I don't see any rational basis for identifying these questions [together]. There 
does not seem any reason to identify whether they [Turing Machines] do it 
[functionally behave and compute] at the psychological level in the same way [as 
us]. It does not seem in principle we can do anything that Turing Machines can't. 
This seems to be a purely physical argument [...] at the level people are talking 
about when asking “what can we do?” people are thinking of discrete descriptions 
of what we do [...] if T is a correct theory of the functioning of system 1, at the 
functional or psychological level, then an isomorphism between S1 and S2 must 
map each property and relation mentioned in T into a property and relation 
defined in S2 in such a way that T comes 135 out true when all references to S1 are 
replaced by references to S2 and all property and relation symbols are reinterpreted 
according to the mapping.47  
Putnam’s description recalls not only the epistemological vocabulary of Sellars 
but also Sellars’ metalinguistic conception as, insofar as knowledge ascriptions 
work to normatively characterize a linguistic performance by placing it within 
the space of reasons, for Sellars, they function by placing a performance within 
a space of norms. Thus the role of a property or premise, or conclusion, is mapped 
onto an inferential process of justification. To say of an agent that they “know” 
something, Sellars claims, is to ascribe to the agent a normative status within a 
discursive economy. Accordingly, the epistemic facts that are tracked by the use 
of such normatively invested epistemic assessments are irreducible to non-
epistemic facts that fulfill an empirical-descriptive role. For Sellars, when 
characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an 
empirical description of that episode or state but, instead, are placing it in the 
logical space of reasons, or “of justifying and being able to justify what one says.”48 
Accordingly, for Sellars: 
 
47 Hilary Putnam “The Transcendence of Reason,” Howison Lectures in Philosophy (1981). Accessed October 
13, 2020. https://gradlectures.berkeley.edu/lecture/transcendence-of-reason/. 
48 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), §36. 
 EKIN ERKAN 319 
[…] the point is not taken care of by distinguishing between knowing bow and 
knowing that, and admitting that observational knowledge requires a lot to “know 
how.” For the point is specifically that observational knowledge of any particular 
fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form X 
is a reliable symptom o f Y. And to admit this requires an abandonment of the 
traditional empiricist idea that observational knowledge “stands on its own feet.49 
Thus, all that the view I am defending requires is that no tokening by S now of 
“This is green” is to count as “expressing observational knowledge” unless it is also 
correct to say of S that he now knows the appropriate fact of the form X is a reliable 
symptom o f Y, namely that (and again I oversimplify) utterances of “This is green” 
are reliable indicators of the presence of green objects in standard conditions of 
perception.50 
As with Sellars’ inferentialist explanation of discursive intentionality, 
functionalism, as articulated by Putnam, sidesteps the metaphysical question of 
what materially constitutes the mind, instead concerning itself with the role that 
mental states play as part of a system of relations. Where Putnam does defend 
this metaphysical question is unsatisfactory, rescinding into the crevices of 
internalism. Following Putnam, internalists hold that the question of what objects 
the world consists in “only makes sense to ask within a theory or description,” 
with truth understood as “some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability.”51  
Contra, externalism, Putnam stakes that, pace internalism, “the world 
consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” and, simultaneously, 
that “truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or 
thought-signs and external things.”52 Putnam contends that there is nothing 
introspectable that could “intrinsically” represent anything and, with this attempt 
to refute skepticism, commits to the doctrine that whatever experiences a person 
has, nothing of which they are aware of via introspection/reflection entails that 
they have any way to represent external objects that require a causal connection 
that could not exist if there were no such objects in the external world.  
Putnam, in refuting the skeptical hypothesis that we are brains in a vat (BiV), 
states that this hypothesis “cannot possibly be true, because it is in a certain way, 
 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., §37. 
51 Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, 49. 
52 Ibid. 
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self-refuting.”53 Elsewhere, Putnam proffers the stipulation (A) that: 
[…] one cannot refer to certain kinds of things, e.g., trees, if one has no causal 
interaction at all with them, or with things in terms of which they can be 
described.54  
According to Putnam, the BiV hypothesis is self-refuting because being a 
brain in a vat precludes being in a position to represent the vat due to the causal, 
and thus functional, interaction necessitated by the aforementioned claim of 
descriptive reference (i.e., “bracketed belief ”).55 However, would not the vat 
create our framework conditions, such that we would necessarily interact with the 
vat? That is, the vat would contain our tractable environment, affecting us and 
being affected by us; thus the condition on reference that the aforementioned 
stipulation (A) imposes would be met. According to Putnam's conception, what 
must be shown is that as brains in a vat, we could not succeed in representing 
vats; thus, Putnam's connection between representation and causal connection 
implies that some necessary condition for being in the appropriate connection 
must be identified. The problem of reference here seems to be related to that of 
doxastic attitudes vis-a-vis composite reference: Putnam’s case against the vat 
hypothesis applies without loss against the hypothesis that there are no tree. 
Because the concept of a tree is a composite constructed out of others concepts 
(i.e., the concepts of a leaf, branch, root, and so on), the causal requirement 
pertains to those basic concepts. In order to make stipulation (A) applicable, there 
must be no trees for, without trees, there could be no interaction (with trees or 
with things by reference to which trees can be denoted). 
Thus, the metaphysical and functional levels of explanation becomes 
complicated. Indeed, descriptions of material systems also come to include and 
require functionalist explanations, with functionalism now becoming increasingly 
less helpful as a constraint for understanding mentality. As Ned Block argued, 
holding a functionalist view of the mind commits to the thesis that: 
each type of mental state is a state consisting of a disposition to act in certain ways 
 
53 Ibid., 7. 
54 Ibid., 16-7. 
55 Having the bracketed belief that p is being in the narrow mental state that one is in whenever one really 
believes that p. One can be in this mental state without really believing that p, since the causal requirements 
for having the concepts involved in p need not be met. Ibid., 28. Also see: Earl Conee, “Reason, Truth and 
History. by Hilary Putnam (review),” Noûs 21, no. 1 (1987): 81-95. 
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and to have certain mental states, given certain sensory inputs and certain mental 
states. So put, functionalism can be seen as a new incarnation of behaviorism. 
Behaviorism identifies mental states with dispositions to act in certain ways in 
certain input situations desire for goal G cannot be identified with, say, the 
disposition to do A in input circumstances in which A leads to G, since, after all, 
the agent might not know A leads to G and thus might not be disposed to do A.56  
Functionalism thus commits to two replacements in distinguishing itself from 
behaviorism:  
i. “sensory inputs” are replaced by “sensory inputs + mental states”  
ii. “disposition to act” is replaced with “disposition to act + have certain 
mental states.”  
As Block points out, functionalists wish to individuate mental states causally—
since mental states have mental causes and effects, as well as sensory causes and 
behavioral effects, functionalists individuate mental states partly in terms of causal 
relations to other mental states.57 According to Putnam’s functionalism, whether 
a system desires something depends on whether it has internal states that have 
certain causal relations to other internal states (viz. to inputs and outputs). Since 
behaviorism makes no such “internal state” requirement, according to the 
functionalist, the behaviorist is guilty of liberalism—i.e., ascribing mental 
properties to things that do not in fact have them, as there are possible systems 
of which behaviorism affirms and functionalism denies that they have mental 
states. 
Daniel Sacilotto proposes a conception of functionalism which is significantly 
broader, terming it “cognitive functionalism.” A “cognitive functionalist” theory 
of mind is one which explains how a set of distinctive set of perceptual, discursive, 
agential, and circumspect abilities jointly instantiate the patterns of psychological 
and social behavior we associate with sapient cognition. This conception takes 
heed of the variances aforementioned and concludes that, across its different 
modalities, the behavior of a functional system is subject to evaluation of success 
or failure, such that it makes sense to speak of a possible malfunction.58  
Similarly, Gualtiero Piccinini advocates for a Putnam-inspired “functionalism 
+ computationalism,” or computational-functionalism (also known as 
 
56 Ned Block, “Troubles With Functionalism,” 268. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Daniel Sacilotto, Saving the Noumenon, ed. Nathan Brown (2020) [manuscript in preparation], §5.3. 
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psychofunctionalism). Piccinini begins with the concept that that the mind is the 
software of the brain and develops this into a thesis where the mind is but an 
aspect of computational organization of the brain, where computational 
organization means the functional organization of a computing mechanism. 
Accordingly, the brain is assumed to be a computing mechanism; it follows that 
those systems that realize minds are likened to mechanisms manipulating strings 
of digits according to general rules. Consequently, this interpretation cashes out 
between minds and many computing mechanisms, according to which minds and 
computing mechanisms manipulate complex combinatorial structures according 
to rules. Piccinini’s postulated mechanism includes memory components to 
explain mental capacities by postulating a specific kind of mechanism with 
specific functional properties; memory components store programs and a 
processor manipulates and executes them. Computational functionalism entails 
that minds are multiply realizable in the sense in which different tokens of the 
same type of computer program can run on different kinds of hardware. 
According to computational functionalism, and against those foes of multiple 
realizability, Piccinini understands mental programs as to be specified and 
studied independently of how they are implemented in the brain, in the same 
way in which one can investigate what programs are or should be run by digital 
computers without worrying about how they are physically implemented. Yet 
Piccinini concedes that thought-experiments such as Block's China-body robot 
have, indeed, demonstrated that computationalism is insufficient a paradigm to 
explain intentionality or phenomenal consciousness. This does not entail that 
computationalism explains no mental capacities nor that intentionality cannot be 
explained functionally by some process other than computation.59  
What computationalist functionalism makes clear is that an individual’s 
mental properties can depend on external factors. More broadly, with cognitive 
and computationalist functionalism, a functional system is subject to evaluations 
of success or failure; thus we can speak of possible malfunctions in both, where 
an output would be something like perceptual error, misrecognition, etc. It is this 
potential for failure that makes functionalism attractive to explicate certain 
 
59 Gualtiero Piccinini, “The Mind as Neutral Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, 
and Computational Functionalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81, no.2 (2010): 273. 
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aspects characteristic of mental life such as cases of misperception or error, which 
seem difficult to explain in terms of bare behavioral regularities. Indeed, this 
cognitive functionalism takes into account Kant's refutation of “material” 
idealism, or global perceptual skepticism, vide justificatory fallibilism and Kant’s 
cognitive semantics. Kant, who did not provide any functionalist scheme, did 
offer us a way to consider any Critical philosophy that deals with particular 
cognitive judgements. Contra Kant’s cognitive semantics, infallibilism presumes 
that logical deduction is necessary to cognitive justification; that is, if our sole 
epistemological resource is logical deduction, then our method can only be 
conceptual analysis, which provides analytic knowledge of conceptual content—
i.e., intension. However, as Kant demonstrates, logical deduction cannot provide 
synthetic knowledge of any truths, neither about allegedly generative causal 
relations between two or more things, nor about relations between our concepts 
and actual particulars.60 Taking Kant's invocation of conceptual explication in 
his Refutation of Idealism into account by suggesting an appeal to broad 
conceptual necessity will not result be epistemologically efficacious unless and 
until we provide sufficient reliable criteria for identifying broad conceptual 
necessity; that is, “[u]ntil we can show how the purported broad conceptual 
necessities pertain to us, to our human cognitive capacities and possibilities, 
rather than merely to some logically possible form of nonhuman cognizance.”61 
This strategy thus blocks skeptical generalization from possibility of perceptual 
error to the alleged universal perceptual error by identifying a pervasive 
dependence of human apperception upon our perceptual awareness of our 
natural surroundings/environs, structuring them within a causal scheme of 
intentionality. Contra Descartes' self-conscious awareness formula—i.e., the 
cogito argument—Kant's premise expounds that “I am aware of my existence as 
determined in time.”62 That is, each of us is aware of ourselves as being aware of 
some appearances happening to occur to us before, during or after other such 
appearances.  
Kant's point is that our capacity to sort and sequence episodes of 
appearances-to-us requires our capacity to identify some apparent temporal 
 
60 Kant, CPR, A217/B276. 
61 Westphal, Kant’s Critical Epistemology, 154. 
62 Kant, CPR, B275. 
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order, which relies on our success in identifying at least some persisting 
perceptible particulars. Sellars, like Kant, aims to block the skeptics' 
generalization from occasional perceptual mistake or misjudgment.63 As Hegel 
insisted, it is inherent to the experience of consciousness that in representing 
objects in the world it distinguishes between how things appear for-itself and how 
things are “in-themselves,” without which the possibility of falsity, nevermind 
truth, remains unintelligible.  
Having specified this, let us distinguish that, for cognitive functionalism not 
to relapse into metaphysical hypostasis, it must distinguish between how 
functional explanation fits into the theorization of cognition in general. In this 
regard, Daniel Dennett famously distinguishes between three “stances” of 
increasing abstraction.64 The “stances” further nuance the distinction between 
material and normative, or empirical and transcendental, descriptive registers of 
mind:  
1) the physical stance, which studies the mind as a physical or chemical 
phenomenon in terms of basic mechanistic laws and a set of initial conditions; 
2) the design stance, which studies the mind as a functional system with definite 
goals, orientations or tendencies, as characteristic of biological and within the 
theoretical purview of dynamics systems; 
3) the intentional stance, which characterizes cognition through mentalistic 
explanations couched in semantic, normative and epistemic vocabularies.  
It is important to note that while Dennett’s framework separates intentional 
descriptions from the “goals” associated with functional descriptions in the 
“design stance,” as we saw above, a normative pragmatics and inferentialist 
semantics can also interpret normative and semantic states functionally. By the 
same token, as Sellars suggested, intentional explanations can also be rendered 
compatible with physicalism and functionalism, as in his own forecasted “process 
ontological” approach that conceives of a stage in the scientific image beyond the 
“mechanistic” conception of causality in physics. This conception is supported by 
 
63 That is, from universal possibility of perceptual error or insufficient justification to the possibility of 
universal perceptual error or insufficient justification (global perceptual skepticism). 
64 Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 87-106; The Intentional Stance 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). 
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normative concepts.65  
Similarly, one may characterize the capacity of a being for representing their 
environments, by drawing a second-order analogy with theoretical reasoning. 
For instance, we say of the frog that it represents the fly as a light-dot within its 
visual field, in analogy with how a sapient agent may hold the belief that “there 
is a fly over there.” Thus, even if intentional vocabulary is explicitly modeled on 
observation reports overt speech, as the Myth of Jones suggests, functional 
explanations to characterize natural phenomena in the physical mode are in turn 
implicitly modeled on the theoretical and practical reasonings which comprise 
the intentional stance. Let us further enumerate the Myth of Jones. 
THE MYTH OF JONES 
In order to illustrate the emergence of the scientific image from the manifest 
image, and the emergence of the manifest image from the original image in turn, 
in Empiricism and the Philosophy of  Mind, Sellars famously proposes a fable of 
speculative anthropology, which he titles the myth of Jones. He imagines a 
community whose members he names our “Rylean ancestors,” who describe 
their world and themselves while lacking the “mentalese” vocabulary of private 
episodes that characterizes the manifest image. These Rylean ancestors are 
capable not only of describing causal regularities in nature or behavioral patterns 
pertaining to their own doings, but also engage in “semantic talk.” That is, they 
participate in saying that, vide overt verbal performances, they mean thus-and-
so.66  
Although the Ryleans already exhibit the capacity to undertake propositional 
 
65 For instance, process ontological accounts inspired by Dynamic Systems Theory, which describe sentient 
and sapient capacities in terms of the non-linear architecture of “self-maintaining systems.” 
66 “With the resources of semantical discourse, the language of our fictional ancestors has acquired a 
dimension which gives considerably more plausibility to the claim that they are in a position to talk about 
thoughts just as we are. For characteristic of thoughts is their intentionality, reference, or aboutness, and it 
is clear that semantical talk about the meaning or reference of verbal expressions has the same structure as 
mentalistic discourse concerning what thoughts are about. It is therefore all the more tempting to suppose 
that the intentionality of thoughts can be traced to the application of semantical categories to overt verbal 
performances, and to suggest a modified Rylean account according to which talk about so-called ‘thoughts’ 
is shorthand for hypothetical and mongrel categorical-hypothetical statements about overt verbal and 
nonverbal behavior, and that talk about the intentionality of these ‘episodes’ is correspondingly reducible 
to semantical talk about the verbal components.” Sellars, EPM, §50. 
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attitudes and use semantic vocabulary, enjoying a robust intentionality or sapient 
mindfulness, they nevertheless lack the intentional vocabulary required for 
making explicit propositional-attitude ascription. Accordingly, terms such as 
“meaning” and “truth” are understood as part of a “behavioristic psychology,” 
pertaining to observable objects and events. But “genius Jones” is on the brink of 
a decisive theoretical breakthrough, leading to the birth of the manifest image of 
man in the world. Jones realizes that by postulating inner episodes as the 
mediating causes of overt action he can explain human behavior more robustly. 
These psychological, internal episodes are intro-spectible psychological episodes, 
which remain observable to the agents that bear them. Acts of introspection are 
accordingly understood as analogous to extro-spectible perceptual acts.  
Such intros-pectible episodes are of two fundamental kinds: i) thoughts, and 
ii) sensations. Thoughts are introduced in analogy with the syntactic structure of 
declarative sentences and, thus, as behaviorally observed in overt speech; 
thoughts are, therefore, likewise semantically organized in inferential relations of 
incompatibility and consequence. Sensations, on the other hand, are introduced 
as states of perceivers; sensations are construed in analogy with the syntactic 
structure of perceptual reports. These perceptual reports are replicated in the 
mind, with their “replicas” modelled on spatially extended and colored objects 
observed in third-person empirical reporting’s discourse. For example, having a 
state of sensing a red hexagon models a red hexagon inner replica which is, in 
turn, based on red square—the latter are conceived to be the common cause for 
the former. These thought-episodes and sensory impressions are critical for 
explaining something the original image was incapable of—the representational 
competences of sapient beings.  
By correlating intro-spectible episodes to publicly observable objects and 
events, Jones can explain how there is a possible asymmetry between an agent’s 
overt behavior (verbal and non-verbal) and states of affairs in the environment. 
In doing so, Jones explains instances of deception, misperception, and error. For 
instance, Jones can say that “Wilfrid is having a sensation of a red hexagon so he 
thinks there is a red hexagon over there!” upon hearing Wilfrid ejaculate: “I see 
a red hexagon over there!” Such is the case even when there is no red hexagon 
“over there.” But the story does not end here. Jones’ account of experience 
matures, and he introduces intentional locutions and propositional attitude-
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ascriptions, which serve to analyze behavior dispositionally and form 
counterfactually robust explanatory-schemas. Thus and so, Jones can say 
“Wilfrid would have not hit the brakes on his car had he not believed that there 
was a red hexagon over there.”  
Such attitude-ascriptions support the ability to explain the conditions for the 
realization or failure of epistemic and volitional acts that bind agents to their 
environments. In turn, Jones’ descriptive-explanatory ability provides a kind of 
epistemic richness when it comes to our capacity of explaining cases of error, 
misrepresentation, deceit, fallibility. Soon enough, Jones is able to say that 
“Wilfrid reached toward the hologram image of a red hexagon because he 
erroneously believes that there is a red hexagon over there, and he believes this 
because he has a sensation of a red hexagon over there even though there is no 
red hexagon.” The emergence of the manifest image constitutes a kind of 
psychological and sociological theoretical breakthrough. It is through this 
breakthrough that experiential episodes are understood as part of a cognitive 
economy. This is a unique kind of inferential functionalist, which involves 
functionally mediating the behavior of agents. Sensations and thoughts are 
introduced indeed as theoretical postulates that help us to form inferences to 
explain the interface between the behavior of sapient agents and their 
environments. 
A key deflationary insight here is to hold that we should separate metaphysical 
commitment from explanatory expediency. The intentional characterization of 
system that lacks mentality (e.g., Ned Block’s China-body robot) should be read 
as serving as a provisional heuristic. That is, we can look at cases of liberalism, 
where mentality is attributed to those systems that do not have minds but 
functionally provide for the correct inputs- and out-puts noting that, when it 
comes to the explanatory role within a proto-theoretical framework, these 
schemas can, and should, eventually succeeded by a properly scientific 
theoretical account that dispenses of such locutions.  
Sellars agrees with Kant that our commonsense spatio-temporal world of 
physical objects and their perceptible qualities are transcendentally ideal 
phenomena; for Sellars, commonsense physical objects do not exist as they are 
conceived within the manifest image of world—”as thus conceived, 
commonsense objects and events exist only in our actual or potential 
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representings of them.”67  
Unlike analytic empiricists and proponents of 'knowledge first epistemology', 
Sellars realized issues about perceptual judgment are subtle and crucial. For 
Sellars conceptual explication is essential but not sufficient for understanding and 
resolving substantive philosophical issues; conceptual analysis seeks explicit, a 
priori, and thus non-empirical specifications/definitions/analyses of principles by 
providing necessary and sufficient conditions of meaning or proper use. In 
contrast, conceptual explication is the partial and provisional specification of key 
terms in use, as explications, unlike analyses, are tied by actual linguistic practice 
to their relevant domains of thought, action and inquiry—therefore also to 
intellectual and cultural history. Much like the classical Pragmatists, Sellars 
explicates our concepts-in-use to gain theoretical understanding.68  
Following Carnap, Sellars' philosophy of language focuses on semantic ascent 
to a constructed formalized meta-language: all abstract entities are to be defined 
in and confined to the meta-language—valid inferences within any language are 
specified in its meta-language. Thus proofs are neither more nor less than 
deductions which accord with the rules instituted by the meta-meta-language 
(e.g., Carnap's L- and P-rules).  
Like Lewis, Sellars develops a distinctive conceptual pragmatism but unlike 
C.I. Lewis, Sellars defends 'synthetic necessary truths', necessary truths which 
depend upon their subject matter.69 Like Kant and C.I. Lewis, Sellars argues 
“that standard empiricist vies of perception and sensory evidence are irreparably 
flawed.”70 A key question of Kant's First Critique is that of intentionality: how are 
we able to be aware of objects or events within the mind?71 Key to intentionality 
is intension pertaining to individuals, universals, and states of affairs.72 For Sellars, 
the actual existence of individuals and their characteristics in the world can be 
recognized or otherwise thought about because our states, our thoughts, and our 
language are structured by functional counterparts of individuals, their attributes, 
 
67 Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 
SM 2.29-2.32, 2.47-2/47, 2.49, 2.58-2.71, 2.71n. 
68 Sellars, SM, 4.24-30, .52, .58, 5.48ff, 6.7. 
69 Ibid., 2.53, 3.18-19 
70 Sellars, EPM, 127-196. 
71 Kant, CPR, A197/B242. 
72 Sellars, SM, 3.1-11 
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and our experiences of them. Sellars takes seriously Wittgenstein's notion of 
language games; in Sellars' metalanguage, attributes are treated as classifications 
of characteristics of things and individuals are treated as instances of various 
characteristics.  
Pace Sellars, our classificatory intensions function something like Fregean 
senses, i.e., ways of being given, within actual or possible acts of representing; 
thus, characterizing these counterpart functions, Sellars treats abstract singular 
terms as distributive singular terms.73  
'Extensions' are individuals who or which exemplify characteristics classified in 
intensions Sellars proposes a functional role semantics which relieves the 
explanatory need for exemplification; Sellars' clarificatory philosophy of mind 
regarding judgment contends that exemplification, like truth, 'is a matter of the 
semantical correctness of a certain performance—roughly the de-quoting of a 
quote expression.74 
 
Pace Sellars’ conception of picturing, semantic assertability, or “S-assertability” offers 
an important kind of internal- and inferential-representation (viz. i-representation) and 
picturing provides us with an attempt to specify a kind of environmental- and external-
representation (viz. e-representation).75 Following Sellars, Huw Price’s rehabilitation of 
picturing/signification deals with intention qua metaphysics. The central target of that 
critique is Representationalism, understood as the idea that: 
There are various motivations for playing the philosophical game with restrictions 
of this kind, but by far the most influential, in contemporary philosophy, is the one 
I discussed in the previous lecture. It rests on two intuitions, or implicit assumptions. 
The first is a kind of prototheory about language, in the light of which the game 
seems to provide a useful informal model of the relation of language to the world. 
This proto-theory accords a key role to the idea that the function of statements is 
to ‘represent’ worldly states of affairs and that true statements succeed in doing so.76  
To be Representationalist, as such, is to think that the proper function of 
 
73 Ibid., , 3.5203.56, 4.12-4.16. 
74 Ibid., 3.51. 
75 Ibid., 4.41n, 
76 Huw Price, Expressivism, Pragmatism, and Representationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
24. 
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assertoric discourse is to track how the world is e-representations are but states of 
a system or sub-system that systematically co-vary with states of the environment 
within which this system is embedded. I-representations, on the other hand, serve 
as connective points within an inferential nexus—thus, they service and proffer 
propositional content. Distinguishing between these two conceptual types of 
representation entails that our talk about truth and reference—that is, our 
semantic metavocabulary—does not (pre)establish how discourse is situationally 
and functionally related to the external world. 
Sachs’ description of Price’s rehabilitation brings out that Sellars’ conception 
of cognitive activity in rerum natura essentially involves mapping/map-like relations 
between states of some information-processing subsystem—whether an animal’s 
brain or the CPU of some android—and detectable regularities embedded within 
the environment. Thus, picturing items need not be linguistic. Despite Sellars 
emphasizes linguistic objects in his account, this is only because language is 
essential to what is a uniquely human mode of picturing, and not because only 
languages picture. Sellars' account of picturing is a subtle elaboration of 
Wittgenstein's insight in the Tractatus that “one can only say of two objects that 
they stand in a certain relation by placing the corresponding referring expressions 
in a counterpart relation.”77 The relations amongst pictured elements cannot 
themselves be represented as elements within the picture.78 The elements “within 
a picture must stand in counterpart relations to the relations amongst the 
elements of whatever is pictures” as picturing is “A relation between two 
relational structures, such as some worldly situation” an dour linguistic, 
perceptual, or conceptual representings of it. Thus, referring expressions are 
ineliminable and the concept of factual truth is but truth as correct picture.79  
The Sellarsian rendering of perceptual data is not immune from critique, and 
perhaps Tyler Burge offers the most damning version. For representational 
content, understood as content with intentionality, in relativized propositions is 
not a veridicality condition. Differences are formulated along otherness and it is 
by way of sortal nouns (“natural kinds”) on whose basis that we can think the 
relations of material incompatibility and consequence between substances. The 
 
77 Sellars, SM, 4.43. 
78 Ibid., 5.18. 
79 Ibid., 5.9 
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notion of “kind” comprises ability-general kinds of perceptual states which are 
freely shareable across individuals, freely repeatable across occasions, and serve 
as instances of those general kinds (i.e., actual occurrent states on particular 
occasions). General kinds of representational content are those that primarily 
figure in the laws of perceptual-state formation; occurrent, context-dependent 
applications are central to veridicality conditions of any perceptual state and to 
psychological accounts of the accuracy of inaccuracy of perceptions. Only 
occurrent perceptual states are accurate or inaccurate. Perception is accurate 
only inasmuch as an occurrent perceptual state is caused by what it is a perception 
of. Occurrence-based aspects can be preserved in memory and shared by 
different psychological modes. Representational content: 
cannot constitute the commitment of a committal state like belief. It cannot 
constitute the condition of success for any propositional committal state. It can be 
true of or false of something. It cannot be true or false. So it cannot be the full 
psychological representational content of a committal psychological state. It is not 
the commitment in the sense specified in the previous paragraph. The 
psychological representational content of the commitment that sets the conditions 
under which a committal state like belief is successful must be a condition on truth. 
Since committal psychological states are those that underlie explanation of all other 
representational psychological states, the appeal to relativized propositions cannot 
be a full account of the psychological representational content of any propositional 
psychological state. The idea that a full account of the psychological content of a 
belief state could appeal purely to a subpropositional representational (or 
psychological) content—together with the particular that the content is true of or 
false of in given instances of a belief—rests on a mistaken conception of committal 
psychological kinds.80 
In its functional and pragmatic basis, Sellars accounts for representation as 
more primitive than consciousness or intentionality, even if representing is 
augmented by the acquisition of sensing and language. Sellars indeed provides us 
with a meaningful way to understand a sapient system’s discursively mediated use 
of theoretical reasonings to describe their worlds and themselves. However, we 
reject Sellars’ claim that reasons are the only source of epistemic warrant and that 
perceptual beliefs without reasons cannot be epistemically warranted—warrants 
 
80 Tyler Burge, “Psychological Content and Egocentric Indexes,” Blockheads!, eds. Adam Pautz and Daniel 
Stoljar (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2019), 52. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 332 
for perceptual belief consist partially in an individual’s being in perceptual states 
which reliably figure in the formation of true beliefs, even if they are not reason-
giving:  
An animal with visual perceptions of, and as of, bodies cannot ‘make sense’ of the 
reference. It need not have reasons. It need not know any criterion for being a body: 
it is enough that the animal be able to discriminate and track bodies by visual 
perception.81 
Animals, children, and many adults lack reasons for their perceptual beliefs 
but are often warranted in having them epistemically entitled to them. To be in 
a contentful state just is to be in a state of a certain specific representational kind. 
Perceptual representational content sets veridicality conditions or, more 
specifically, accuracy conditions—”accuracy” discerns and distinguishes 
perception’s conditions from truth conditions, which are propositional. The 
fundamental point about perceptual states is that they, and hence their 
representational contents, can be accurate or inaccurate, within some range of 
approximation. “Egocentric indexes,” representing particulars that are not 
perceived, mark the present time, the origin or anchor of a spatial framework, or 
the believer—thus a believer’s referring depends on the structural framework of 
the perception or perceptual belief.82 Consequently, epistemological warrants 
ought not be confined to reasons—perceptual content grounds much 
propositional content. 
SUPERVENIENCE: FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO METAPHYSICS 
The Myth of Jones makes clear that, in the case of justified belief, any such belief 
cannot be what Jaegwon Kim disparagingly terms a “brute fundamental fact” 
unrelated to the kind of belief it is.83 Thus we have two further points to make: 
i. When it comes to justified belief, there must be a reason for it, a reason 
grounded in the factual descriptive properties of that particular belief. As 
demonstrated by the case of Putnam, however, if the descriptive properties 
are based on internalism and not reference to some particular, then we 
 
81 Ibid., 46. 
82 Ibid., 71-79.  
83 Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 1993), 235. 
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are setting ourselves up for Gettier-type problems.84  
ii. II)  Furthermore, values, even if not reducible to facts, must be consistent 
with the relevant framework’s fact-laden environ. Objects/particulars that 
are indiscernible in regard to these facts must, therefore, be considered as 
indiscernible in regard to value. Additionally, there must be 
nonvaluational reasons/grounds for the attribution of values; such 
reasons/grounds must be generalizable, covered by rules or norms.  
Consequently, I) and II) correspond to “weak supervenience” and “strong 
supervenience,” respectively. 85 Belief in the supervenience of value upon fact is, 
according to Kim, fundamental to the very concepts of value and valuation. For 
a concept to be significant—i.e., valuational—it must be governed by some 
stipulated set of impositions/criteria. These criteria cannot be arbitrary, as they 
must ultimately rest on factual properties, characteristics, relationships of objects 
and events that are held under evaluation. Thus the problem of the infinite 
regress, or the “infinitely descending series of valuational concepts, each 
depending on the one below it as its criterion of application.”86 In the spirit of 
Wittgenstein, Lorenz Puntel reminds of that what  
are currently presented as “theories of truth” are as a rule individual subtheories of 
truth. The two best known arise from the traditional distinction between the 
concept and the criterion of truth. Theories thematizing the criterion question are 
 
84 Internalism can be summarized as the thesis that: S’s belief that p is justified if and only if believing that 
p is the attitude towards p that best fits S’s evidence, where the latter is understood to depend only on S’s 
internal mental states. 
85 Kim specifies these, writing: “A weakly supervenes on B if and only if necessarily for any x and y if x and 
y share all properties in B then x and y share all properties in A—that is, indiscernibility with respect to B 
entails indiscernibility with respect to A.” “A weakly supervenes on B if and only if necessarily for any 
property F in A, if an object x has F, then there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and if any y has 
G it has R.” A strongly supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x and each property F in A, if x 
has F, then there is a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any y has G, it has F. [....] The 
idea of strong supervenience comes to this: if St. Francis is a good man, there must be some combination of 
these virtues (say, honesty and benevolence) such that St. Francis has it, and anyone who has it must be a 
good man. This particular combination of the traits, however, need not be the only one in the base family 
that can ‘ground’ being a good man; Socrates, too, is a good man, but the virtues that he has are courage 
and honesty rather than honesty and benevolence. Socrates is a good man in virtue of being courageous 
and honest while St. Francis is a good man in virtue of being honest and benevolent. Generally speaking, a 
supervenient property will have alternative supervenience bases - base properties that are each sufficient for 
the supervening property.” Kim, Supervenience and Mind, 58. 
 
86 Ibid., 236. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 334 
conveniently termed criteriological theories of truth, and theories having the 
concept of truth as their subject matter, definitional theories.87 
A “criteriological” reading, on the other hand, proposes to explain away the 
functional description of mindless systems in terms of bare causal regularities. 
The criteriological realist will paraphrase locutions like “the nose’s function is to 
smell” into causal statements such as “scent is a consequence of the nose,” where 
functions are understood as a select subset of the causal regularities that 
characterize a system’s behavior.88 This strategy appears attractive not only as a 
means to avoid a zealous transposition of intentionality onto mindless nature, but 
also insofar as it is conducive to a naturalization of intentionality that reduces 
reasons to causes, i.e. translating the normativity and propositional attitudes 
associated with sapient mindfulness to causal-material regularities amenable to 
naturalistic description, making no use of intentional vocabulary. However, as Jay 
Rosenberg argues, it is difficult to see how this reductive alternative 
accommodates functions within a causal story. Since many things result from the 
action of the nose other than the circulation of scent (for instance, nose hair 
prevent debris from entering), it is just not clear which consequences identify 
those “essential” causal links that make up the functional integrity of a system, 
apart from its accidental causal effects. 
One would accordingly need criteria to explain the “surplus content” that 
allows one to discern those correlations that instantiate functional proprieties 
from those causal relations that contain consequents which are not considered 
part of a system’s “proper functioning.” Given this awesome difficulty, it is 
tempting to take the reductive strategy to an eliminativist limit, claiming that 
functional explanations are at best proto-scientific in character, but that they do 
no more than isolate those causal regularities that appear to us most difficult to 
characterize in purely mechanical ways (all while seeming necessary to 
characterize a system’s behavior). An additional alternative emerges, however, in 
relation to the criteriological translation of function into causal explanations, one 
which both elides teleological characterization yet preserves the propriety of 
functional explanation. This entails formalizing the concept of function within a 
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broader theoretical schema, distilling its operational-mathematical core from its 
intentional-semantic envelopment.  
By flattening cognition into a barren conception of “machinic function,” one 
does not only elide what of sentience and sapience as it is implemented in organic-
human systems must remain in order for any system to count as having a mind, 
blurring the line between the transcendental dimension of cognition and its 
biophysical modes of implementation altogether. Moreover, it also falls prey to a 
theoretical nihilism that, however, makes its own explanatory aims and discursive 
position unintelligible, yielding an iteration of what John McDowell calls “bald 
naturalism,” which incurs on a pragmatic contradiction. For just like naturalist 
accounts which seek to eliminate the manifest image altogether in the name of 
an assimilation of man into the scientific image, “machinic-computationalist-
cognitive” variants of functionalism eliminate the intentional stance. If an 
explanatory divide between the space of reasons and nature mystifies the former 
and, in turn, generates metaphysical dualism, the elimination of the framework 
of persons in the name of empirical function renders inexplicable how 
“materialism” can be understood as a method, disavowing the normatively laden 
project of physicalism, where notions of description, explanation, and 
justification are seen as implicitly joined to presenting a conceptually meaningful 
theory of mentality.  
As Joseph Rouse insists, seconding McDowell’s rejoinder to bald naturalist 
accounts:  
“a ‘baldly naturalistic’ conception of ourselves not only overreaches its empirical 
justification. A radically comprehensive naturalism would undermine its own 
intelligibility as a conception of the world. The scientific image and the 
understanding that it promises depend upon our capacities for conceptual 
understanding and its rational accountability. These very capacities for conceptual 
thought cannot be fully assimilated within the terms of a scientific understanding 
of nature.”89  
This account underscores that what “bald naturalists” presuppose ushers the 
achievements of the natural sciences as rationally justified while forcing any 
conceptual-descriptive register of understanding into a domain that outpouches 
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rational accountability. We seem thus suspended between two dangers: the 
normativist-dualist risk of making the connection between the transcendental 
dimension of the space of reasons and nature unintelligible, and the reductionist-
monist danger of making explanation and theorization as a whole unintelligible. 
Indeed, the  
rocks of Scylla loom on one side, where attempts to ground conceptual content on 
merely ‘Given’ causal or experiential impacts run aground,” and, on “the other 
beckons the whirlpool Charybdis, in which the intralinguistic coherence of 
purported conceptual judgments would instead become a mere ‘frictionless 
spinning in a void.90  
To avoid the Scylla of humanist piety as well as the Charybdis of inhumanist 
triviality, Negarestani warns against a “flat functionalism” according to which 
“function implies an unconstrained abstract realization in so far as there is one-
to-one correspondence between the realizer and realized features. Function a 
abstractly realizes activity b if elements of a map onto or are isomorphic with 
elements of b.”91 This is the danger of trivializing functional propriety by way of 
a “formalization” that unwittingly reiterates indiscriminate transposition. An 
adequate cognitive functionalism must thus theorize the invariant conditions and 
generic capacities which instantiate cognition in distinction from their empirical 
basis. Functional complexity becomes ubiquitous when any function can be 
realized by any kind of input-output procedure and, accordingly, any kind of 
“stuff,” understood in the broadest sense.  
The functional description of mind, requires an account of the integration of 
distinct processes, activities, and roles—both causal and logical. Without a precise 
account of this integration—how different activities with causal or logical roles 
are put together and integrated, and how different constraints are satisfied—the 
description of mind is merely the description of arbitrary “stuff.” Meeting the 
demarcation question concerning how to isolate the functional proprieties of 
sapient cognition must be compatible with a naturalist perspective that answers 
the emergence question concerning how mind appears in the course of natural 
history. And this requires that we explain in what sense functional explanations 
can also play an explanatory role, in describing the conditions for the emergence 
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of mind in nature. We find an example of such a mature attempt in Jay 
Rosenberg’s naturalist answer to bind teleological and criteriological readings: 
the “surplus content” which tracks the proper functioning of biological systems is 
intelligible by embedding linear causal regularities into a holistic and diachronic 
explanatory frame, i.e., the theory of evolution describes how processes of 
adaptation, heredity, selection and mutation explain the tendential behavior of 
organic integrity. Given our earlier example, the sought “surplus content” is an 
implicit appeal to the contributions of scent to the biological integrity and 
adaptability of organisms so structured (i.e., efficient internal transport of oxygen 
and information to the olfactory bulb, with odors directly routing to the limbic 
system, including the amygdala and hippocampus, regions related to emotion 
and memory). Such an appeal becomes both explicit and explanatory in the 
context of an evolutionary account of the origin and proliferation of organisms 
possessing such olfactory systems. The theory of evolution grounds functional 
explanations without appeal to principles different in kind from those structuring 
causal explanations. In the same direction, Johanna Seibt argues that the desired 
continuity between bare physical regularities, functional dynamics in mindless 
nature, and the functionality associated with the robust intentional agency of 
cognitive systems, can be explained within a naturalistic register in a process-
ontological idiom.92 
THE NON-REDUCTIVE PHYSICALIST’S POISONED CHALICE 
Having asked about mental emergence broadly, another question that is 
somewhat related is still left looming: can mental states be separated from 
physical states? Let us return to the more innocuous initial scenario that Parfit 
poses in the teletransportation case, where there is no haunting overhang of my 
heart damage and looming death. When the aforementioned teletransportation 
process was activated by my pushing of a green button, my body was instantly 
disassembled while all the exhaustive information concerning my bodily structure 
and composition was recorded and transmitted to Mars. My replica and I could 
not be distinguished by way of appealing to any “current intrinsic physical 
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differences.”93 Given that my replica is my physical replica, the question also is 
introduced of whether the replica is also my psychological replica? Is my replica 
identical with me in all mental respects? If my replica shares (aesthetic, culinary, 
etc.) tastes, proclivities, memories and so on, as, pace Parfit, we ought to 
reasonably presume that any such replica will, then this means that we have 
tacitly espoused the mind-body “supervenience” thesis: 
The mental supervenes on the physical in that things (objects, events, organisms, 
persons, and so on) that are exactly alike in all physical properties cannot differ 
with respect to mental properties. That is, physical indiscernibility entails 
psychological indiscernibility.94 
 
Thus, one may say that there can be no mental difference without a physical 
difference. Jaegwon Kim has argued that the supervenience of mental states on 
physical states has dire consequences for theories of mental causation.95  
Before moving further, let us note that when we say that there can be no 
mental difference without a physical difference, there is a presumption that a 
difference in mentality is comprised of physical substrates. Pain, for instance, is 
comprised of c-fibers firing, and we can consider what those c-fibers are made 
up of and go all the way down to the atoms, quarks, leptons. This mereological 
picture of the world and of mental states in particular describes any state as 
comprised of levels. According to Kim, every level consists of two components, 
including some set of entities “constituting the domain of particulars for that level 
and a set of properties defined over this domain.”96 The structural-mereological 
relation is as follows: entities belonging to a given layer are mereologically 
composed of entities belonging to the lower levels, and this relation generates a 
hierarchical ordering of the levels; in turn, this multitiered picture carries some 
idealized assumption that there is a bottom tier, a layer of entities that have no 
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physically significant parts. 
How are the properties that characterize entities at some given level related 
to those entities that characterize entities of its adjacent levels? Given that entities 
at distinct levels are ordered by the part—whole relation, is it the case that 
properties associated with different levels are also ordered by some distinctive and 
significant relationship? 
Where reductionism claims that higher-level properties are, after a certain 
level, reducible to lower-level ones, rivals like eliminativism and non-
reductionism counter this position. Where the non-reductivist position and 
eliminativist position concede that higher-level properties cannot be reduced to 
lower-level ones, they differ on the status of those irreducible higher-level 
properties. Eliminativism expunges any such descriptor where a posteriori 
possible, following the science “all the way down.” Just as Patricia Churchland 
thinks that using a descriptor like pain concedes to the folk-psychology speak of 
those misinformed psychiatrists who once believed in the descriptor “hysteria,” 
such “useless danglers” must be expunged from the correct picture of our reality.97  
Nonreductivism, on the other hand, holds that they can be real and genuine 
properties of objects and events in our world, such that there are ineliminable 
parts that ontologically obtain. Nonreductivism, unlike eliminativism, rejects 
reducibility as a means of testing whether higher-level properties are legitimate. 
Nonreductivism asserts that such higher-level properties can, indeed, form some 
autonomous domain for the sake of an independence “special science” that is, 
itself, ontologically irreducible to the sciences that occur and draw from lower-
level phenomena. This is an attempt at respecting autonomy and the closedness 
of causal processes at fundamental physical levels, describing self-contained levels 
that are immune to causal intrusions from neighboring levels. As it relates to the 
mind-body problem, specifically, non-reductive physicalism articulates two 
characteristic theses that apply to nonreductivism:  
It consists of the two characteristic theses of nonreductivism: its ontology is physical 
monism, the thesis that physical entities and their mereological aggregates are all 
that there is; but its “ideology” is antireductionist and dualist, consisting in the claim 
that psychological properties are irreducibly distinct from the underlying physical 
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and biological properties. Its dualism is reflected in the belief that, though 
physically irreducible, psychological properties are genuine properties nonetheless, 
as real as underlying physical-biological properties. And there is a corollary about 
psychology: psychology is an autonomous special science independent of the 
physical and biological sciences in its methodology and in the concepts and 
explanations it generates.98 
According to non-reductive physicalism, all concrete existents are physical 
and there are no nonphysical particulars or mental substances. When invoking 
mental states in psychological explanations, we are “presumptively committed to 
their causal efficacy; for any phenomenon to have an explanatory role, its 
presence or absence in a given situation must make a difference—a causal 
difference.”99 Why would Kim wish to save mental causation and treat this as 
something fundamentally real? 
One such answer is related to human agency’s being a byproduct of our 
mental states, including beliefs, desires, and intentions. Such states seem to have 
causal effects in the physical world. Additionally, the possibility of human 
knowledge presupposes mental causation: perception necessitates the causation 
of perceptual experiences and beliefs by physical objects and events around us. 
Reasoning, by which we acquire new knowledge and belief from the existing fund 
of what we already know or believe, involves the causation of new belief by old 
belief; more generally, causation arguably is essential to the transmission of 
evidential groundedness. Memory is a complex causal process involving 
interactions between experiences, their physical storage, and retrieval in the form 
of belief. If you take away perception, memory, and reasoning, you pretty much 
take away all of human knowledge . To move on, it seems plain that the possibility 
of psychology as a theoretical science capable of generating law -based 
explanations of human behavior depends on the reality of mental causation: 
mental phenomena must be capable of functioning as indispensable links in 
causal chains leading to physical behavior. A science that invokes mental 
phenomena in its explanations is presumptively committed to their causal 
efficacy; for any phenomenon to have an explanatory role, its presence or 
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absence in a given situation must make a difference - a causal difference. 
Thus, The disjunction of nomologically possible realization (consider, for 
instance, pain) is said to be a heterogenous disjunction for Kim. But surely these 
are not perfectly heterogenous, as the disjuncts of pain resemble one another 
insofar as they are (all) realizations of pain. disjunction of physico-chemical 
properties that can, compatibly with the laws of nature, realize pain. Pain is 
nomically coextensive with a heterogenous physico-chemical disjunction. 
Therefor either both pain and the disjunction are kinds, or neither pain nor the 
disjunction are kinds. Why? Because the kinds in question are the projectible 
properties, and one of two nomically equivalent properties is projectible if and only 
if the other is. That is, more specifically, Kim is talking about “objective 
projectability, which hinges on a notion of objective evidential support .... if there 
is a certain degree of evidential support for the obtaining of one property, the 
same degree of objective support obtains for any nomically equivalent property 
whether or not anyone knows about it.”100 
This picture is made more colorful and complicated by the notion of collective 
mentality and collective mental states, as described by Bryce Huebner:  
The term “macrocognition” is intended as shorthand for the claim that system-
level cognition is implemented by an integrated network of specialized 
computational mechanisms, and my account of distributed cognition is equally at 
home in discussions of individual or collective mentality. My central hypothesis is 
that a plausible defense of collective mentality must take up the perspective of 
macrocognition to demonstrate that groups are minded in the same sense that we 
are.101 
Ecosocial insect colonies, with diffuse sensory apparatuses extending in 
numerous directions, is one such example; consider the example of the 
honeybee's so-called “hive mind”. The distributed information conveyed by these 
individual dances allows for a huge quantity of sensory information to be 
integrated in a way that can underwrite the goal-directed behavior of collecting 
nectar. What is key to the honeybee hive mind example is that a complex 
interaction of various-low-level representations is produced during the process of 
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data acquisition. But this is not just simply limited to the example of animal 
collective mentality. Huebner gives the example of a Crime Scene Investigation 
(CSI), where the collection of data begins at an emergency call center, with a call 
handler recording an initial representation the crime scene in real time. 
Consequently, the representation is passed down to a dispatch officer, who 
interprets it, recording and pooling the relevant information while gating off the 
information that is irrelevant for the dispatching officers. Investigators will then 
go to the scene and collect artefacts, dusting fingerprints, examining footprints, 
collecting biosamples (hair folicules, dead skin, saliva, etc.) and, perhaps, 
discarded clothing. The goal here is to distill the scene into a collection of 
evidential representations, including photographs, videos, clothing, fingerprints 
dustings; the relevant information is extracted first so as to allow for these 
representations to be collected for the purposes of analysis, with the eventual goal 
of a future prosecution: 
The processing of information by a CSI team does not depend exclusively on the 
architecture of the system, nor does it depend exclusively on the intentional states 
of the individuals that compose the team. Whether a representation will be passed 
along to other members of the team is determined by a complicated set of shared 
background assumptions, considerations about which features of the environment 
are likely to be salient to others, more global considerations about what sorts of 
information will be useful in achieving the goal of the collectivity, and facts about 
how data was interpreted in the past. Each of the individual investigators needs 
only know what they should do when they encounter particular sorts of 
environmental variables, yet through the interaction and coordination of these 
individuals, a narrative emerges that sometimes allows for the satisfaction of the 
collective goal of prosecution.102 
Similarly, romantic partnerships produce distributed memories, where 
couples function as transactive and macrocognitive systems. Network-centric 
warfare also relies on a centralized control system, alongside a standard 
hierarchical organization, with salient information passed to centralized control 
systems. Macrocognitive systems also proffers in research teams and navigation 
crews.  
But, if mental states supervene on physical states in the scenario of 
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psychological events, this leaves us with “too many causes of physical behavior.”103 
According to mind-body supervenience, every mental event, M, has a physical 
cause, p* . Kim articulates the claim of mind-body supervenience as an inter-
order, rather than inter-level, scheme, writing that:  
Mental properties supervene on physical properties in the sense that if something 
instantiates any mental property M at t , there is a physical base property P such 
that the thing has P at t , and necessarily anything with P at a time has M at that 
time.104 
While we may think that it makes sense to say that a mental state “m” (e.g., 
desire to eat) causes a physical event “p” (e.g., eating), mind-body supervenience 
entails that every physical event (eating) also has a physical cause p* (the neural 
processes that comprise being hunger, or the state we refer to re: our “desire to 
eat”)—the physical state that implements the desire. To acknowledge that mental 
event m, occurring at t, is a cause of physical event p but deny that p has a 
physical cause at t would violate the causal closure of the physical domain.105 This 
results in lapsing into Cartesian interactionist dualism, which mixes physical and 
nonphysical events in a single causal chain. To acknowledge that p has also a 
physical cause, p*, at t is to invite the question: 
“Given that p has a physical cause p*, what causal work is left for m to contribute? 
The physical cause therefore threatens to exclude, and preempt, the mental cause. 
This is the problem of causal exclusion.106 
The causal exclusion problem can be evaded if mental properties (or events) 
are identified as physical properties (or events); this means a reduction of the 
mental to the physical. That is to say, if we reject distinctness then there is no 
need to worry about exclusion, for the mental and physical do not even appear 
to be competing sufficient causes. Thus exclusion is supposed to be a special 
problem for those who accept distinctness—dualists and non-reductive 
physicalists, alike 
 
103 Ibid., 26.  
104 Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2000), 23. 
105 The principle of (physical) causal closure the principle that "if you pick any physical event and trace out 
its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take you outside the physical domain. That is, no causal chain 
will ever cross the boundary between the physical and the non-physical." Kim, Mind in a Physical World, 40.  
106 Ibid., 37. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 344 
According to Kim, the exclusion argument necessitates that we accept 
reductive physicalism; according to the doctrine of reductive physicalism, mental 
and other such high-level properties of the world are identified as equipollent 
with lower-level properties. For Kim, the exclusion argument demonstrates that 
any non-reductive physicalism will result in epiphenomenalism.  
In response to the problems introduced by Kim's assessment, non-reductive 
physicalists like Karen Bennett have responded with the aim to maintain that 
physicalism does not need to reduce mental properties, and other high-level 
properties, into lower-level physical properties. Bennet's approach is termed 
“compatibilism.”107 This line of “compatibilist” thought can be traced back to 
Normal Malcolm, Stephen Yablo, Mellor, and Pereboom and Kornblith; a 
similar, albeit somewhat modified position is carved out in Sydney Shoemaker's 
work.108  
Consider Bennett’s paper, “Being Reduced.”109 Neutral concerning the a 
priori entailment of the mental by the physical while rejecting the metaphysical 
possibility of zombie worlds, Bennett believes that non-reductive physicalists 
should not think that mental events and properties are not identical to any 
physical ones. According to Bennett, we have narrow physical properties, events, 
and objects on the one side of our conceptual scheme, as these figure in the laws 
of a clearly physical science. Neurons, for instance are narrow physical objects 
because they figure into neuroscience. There are, simultaneously, broad physical 
properties, events, and objects; these are composed on the aforementioned 
narrow ones by means of property-forming operations such as disjunction, 
conjunction, and quantification. By way of the various forms of spatio-temporal, 
mereological and modal limit-conditions, broadly physical events are constructed 
from those aforementioned narrowly physical ones. Accordingly, Bennett 
formulates non-reductive physicalism as the view that mental states are broadly 
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physical and not narrowly physical. This is why Bennett thinks it is a mistake for 
the non-reductive physicalist to claim that mental properties are not physical at 
all; they are physical, but not in the narrow sense. Thus and so, there is no 
neurological state that we can point to and accord as identical to the mental state, 
for this mental state is constructed out of those neurological states/properties. 
There is a functional characterization couched in Bennett's conception, as she 
picks out some narrow physical property as the realizer of a mental state. 
Accordingly, Bennett's non-reductive physicalism confronts the role of the mental 
in causation by way of over-determination. Had there been only one of the causes 
of the effect, the effect would have been caused by the other (and vice versa); 
thus, following these two counterfactuals, the effect is vacuously true. Consider 
the two following conditionals:  
(1) if m had happened without p, e would still have happened;  
(2) if p had happened without m, e would still have happened.  
The real action here pertains to (2); Bennett argues that only the physicalist can 
say that (2) is vacuously true or false. It is vacuously true in case it is possible that 
p happens without m and is false if (2) is vacuously true. According to Bennett, 
the dualist cannot take place in this operation. 
Bennett's compatibilist strategy, grossly put, is to argue that the mental and 
physical may be sufficiently tightly coupled that they fail to satisfy a plausible 
criteria for overdetermination, but without being identical. Bennett argues that 
the compatibilist solution is available to the non-reductive physicalist but not the 
dualist. Bennett outlines the defense of non-reductive physicalism by construing 
the exclusion problem with the following mutually exclusive claims: 
i. Distinctness: mental and physical properties are distinct; 
ii. Completeness: every effect has a sufficient physical cause;  
iii. Efficacy: mental events at least sometimes cause physical events, and do so 
in virtue of the mental properties of the event; 
iv. Nonoverdetermination: events are not systematically overdetermined; 
v. Exclusion: if an effect has more than one sufficient cause, then it is 
overdetermined.110 
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According to this doctrine, distinctness is maintained, but exclusion is proven 
to not obtain. That is, there is some effect that has more than one sufficient cause 
but is not overdetermined. Yablo has argued that if the mental and the physical 
are, indeed, related as determinable and determinate then they do not 
overdetermine one another. One example we may consider is the relation 
between the color green and emerald; “being green” and “being emerald” are 
distinct properties. It is possible to for something to be emerald and not green; it 
is possible for something to be green and not emerald. It is plausible that when a 
driver accelerates their stopped car at a traffic light, whether that traffic light is 
emerald or green do not causally compete. A driver accelerates because the traffic 
light is green; the driver accelerates because the traffic light is emerald. In the 
latter case, this is because emerald is a contained as a part of being green. 
Anything that is emerald is necessarily green. All members of the set green 
include all members of the set green.  
The compatibilist argument offers that, much like parts and whole do not 
causally compete because they are distinct while not being “wholly distinct,” 
similarly determinates and their determinables do not causally compete because 
they are distinct but not “wholly distinct”. Bennett's task is to show that the mental 
and the physical can each be sufficient causes of some effect without thereby 
overdetermining this effect. For Bennett, overdetermination occurs only when 
two counterfactuals are both non-vacuously true.111 If one or the other 
counterfactual is false or only vacuously true, Bennett argues, then there is no 
overdetermination. According to Bennett, non-reductive physicalists should deny 
that the exclusion argument is a good argument for reduction while insisting that 
the exclusion argument is a good argument for the claim that the mental is 
nothing over and above the physical.  
Bennett's compatibilist view is, in fact, a nuanced denial of non-
overdetermination, where non-overdetermination is understood as the claim that 
no events are systematically overdetermined. Compatibilism therefore presents a 
modal analysis of overdetermination by way of using counterfactual scenarios. 
Bennett espouses that an effect can have multiple sufficient causes, and that this 
can be the case without the effect being “problematically” overdetermined. Take 
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causes M and P, and effect E. According to Bennett, “problematic” 
overdetermination occurs only if the influences of causes M and P are strongly 
modally independent. That is: if cause P had happened without cause M 
happening, effect E still would have happened; If cause M had happened without 
cause P, effect E still would have happened. 
Christopher Devlin Brown, in response, gives the example of a firing squad 
shooting someone as an example of such “problematic” overdetermination.112 
Where one shooter, and the one shooter's one bullet, would do, the scenario of 
death by firing squad involves multiple shooters and multiple bullets. For the sake 
of the aforementioned scenario, let us limit the firing squad to two shooters. Let 
us also limit the firing squad's two shooters to shooting one bullet each into some 
unfortunate condemned person. One shooter is named M and the other shooter 
is named P. The event E is the event of shooter M and shooter P firing a bullet 
each into the condemned person; that event is the death of this unnamed 
condemned fellow. The example at hand has one minimal assumption: that the 
unfortunate fellow's death is causally dependent on M or P in the actual world. 
Now, vide David Lewis' possible worlds, let us consider a nearby counterfactual 
world containing only M; in this possible world, E is a consequence of M's firing. 
There is another nearby counterfactual world containing only P; in this 
counterfactual world, E occurs after P's firing. If there is a nearby counterfactual 
world containing only M (as just described) and there is a nearby counterfactual 
world containing only P (as just described), then E is overdetermined by M and 
P. If E had not occurred in both the counterfactual scenarios, then it would be 
the case that two bullets are needed to kill this condemned person and one bullet 
alone would e insufficient; then, in this scenario, “M's and P's firings jointly 
constitute a single sufficient cause and E is not problematically 
overdetermined.”113 If E occurs in one of the counterfactuals and not the other, 
then E only has one sufficient cause. 
Suppose the actual-world scenario where M and P are different names for the 
same shooter (perhaps M is their given name and P their nickname). This is such 
a world where there cannot be event E without both M and P, as there is no 
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actual world containing M shooting without P shooting. Thus, it would be 
vacuously true that every world containing M and not P is one in which E follows 
M's shooting; in this most recent case, this would be vacuously true since there 
are no such worlds, as M and P refer to the same person.   
Contending with the mind-brain identity thesis, the non-reductionist will 
deny that mental and “narrowly physical” properties are the identical to each 
other. Instead, the non-reductionist allows mental properties to be realized by 
different physical states. That is, the non-reductionist concedes to Multiple 
Realizability: pain is not identical to c-fibers firing, as Commander Data the 
functional isomorph could feel pain as could an alien or cyborg with different 
biological-chemical neural makeup (viz. silicon). This does not affect the ability 
of the nonreduction to use Bennett's test for non-problematic overdetermination, 
for as long as either “M without P is followed by E” or “P without M is followed 
by E” is vacuously true, then the test is passed.  
The nonreductivist physicalist, per Bennett, can have events that involve 
high-level mental properties, or M, and low-level physical realizers, or P, where 
these realizers “come out as cases of non-problematic overdetermination.”114 For 
the non-reductive physicalist, the physical realm metaphysically determines the 
mental realm. This means that there are no metaphysically possible worlds that 
have this actual world's P properties but without the M properties. For Bennett, 
causal events that involve these properties will not will “pass the test for non-
problematic overdetermination.”115. There are no such worlds in which E occurs 
but it is not due to P realizing M.  
Dualists, on the other hand, according to Bennett, are necessarily committed 
to the argument that there are possible worlds that copy actual-world physical 
properties (P) but do not copy the mental properties (M). 
Brown, however, recalls a coherent dualist position that he terms 
“necessitarian dualism.” Necessitarian dualists embrace dispositional 
essentialism, as they believe that properties possess nomological profiles 
essentially. This position he draws from Terence Horgan and Jessica Wilson, who 
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espouse the claim that P without M causes E come out as vacuously true.116 This 
position espouses property dualism, the view that consciousness or its 
determinates are fundamental, or perfectly natural, properties. If property 
dualism is true, then consciousness is a fundamental ingredient in reality (or more 
determinate experiential properties are) and so has obvious significance in at least 
one sense. Furthermore, if property dualism is true, then consciousness is highly 
descriptively significant because it’s a fundamental property, which would be 
confirmed through application of a bottom-up epistemology.117 
If this is the case, then, Bennett fails at creating a solution to the exclusion 
problem that a non-reductionist could endorse but a dualist cannot. The 
necessitarian dualist accepts that all physical effects have sufficient physical 
causes. However, the necessitarian dualist can, in addition, also invoke Bennett's 
compatibilism where physical effects are non-problematically over-caused by 
physical properties and the nonphysical properties that accompany. Bennett, 
querying whether compatibilism requires physicalism, asserts that necessitarian 
dualism, or “metaphysical-necessitarian-dualism” is incoherent or unmotivated. 
Brown, however, disagrees. 
Brown has two responses to this claim. First of all, if dualism is not tied to 
dispositional essentialism without becoming non-dualism, then it results in 
contradiction. Necessitarian dualism, according to Brown, is a mongrel position. 
Necessitarian dualism, like epiphenomenalist dualism, argues that the 
nonphysical is nomologically necessitated by the physical: when P is realized in 
any possible world containing law L, nonphysical property M is nomologically 
necessitated. Unlike epiphenomenalist dualism, necessitarian dualism allows for 
M to be an overdetermining nonphysical cause for a physical effect. This, Brown 
describes, is borrowed from interactionist dualism. Thus, “necessitarian dualism 
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allows the mental to be causally efficacious via overdetermination.”118 Lastly, 
dispositional essentialism plays a role, whereby properties are individuated by 
way of their nomological roles (i.e., “what a property does is constitutive of its 
function”). The result of adding this piece to the puzzle is that every world 
containing P is also a world containing L, as L is necessary for P; every world that 
contains P and L is, thus and so, also a world containing M. Consequently, non-
physical M is necessitated by physical P in every world in which P occurs. 
What of Chalmers' zombie argument? As the more rigorous instantiation of 
Descartes’ argument for mind-body interactionist dualism, this conceivability 
argument proffers molecule-for-molecule duplicates of us who are functional 
isomorphs save for the accompanying mind. The zombie argument offers that 
consciousness must be something that is not a physical property or set of 
properties in the world but is an additional component that does not arise from 
the organization of the forces and particles of physics. It follows that is such a 
scenario is possible, then physicalism is false, as physicalism requires that the 
physical necessitates the mental, and the mental, at its most fundamental, is 
physical. The necessitarian dualist cannot appeal to the zombie argument, as the 
necessitarian dualist says there is no possible world in which our world's physical 
properties would fail to generate mental properties and, thus, there is no possible 
zombie world. Thus, the necessitarian dualist appeals to, say, Jacksons' knowledge 
argument or Levine's explanatory gap argument.119 Such arguments rely on 
epistemic considerations rather than modally based arguments for dualism, 
arguing that certain mental properties cannot be inferred from knowledge of 
physical properties, or that physical properties fail to explain certain mental 
properties.  
Thus, the non-reductive physicalist is presented with a critical juncture. The 
exclusion problem motivates almost all of the identical premises as the causal 
closure argument for physicalism. If we deny a premise in the exclusion 
argument, the dualist will be able to counter the causal closure argument. Bennet 
responds to the exclusion argument by allowing “non-problematic” 
determination. This is precisely why the compatibilist doctrine goads the 
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physicalist into a Catch-22. Bennett's route to escape Kim's exclusion argument 
by prodding us into verdant grounds by way of non-reductive physicalism to 
invariably ends up supplying dualists with the tools to escape the causal closure 
argument. Accordingly, if we argue for compatibilism, we end up undercutting 
the argument that bolsters physicalism.  
The compatibilist thinks that we can argue against the reductive physicalist’s 
conception of Distinctness without putting these aforementioned claims together. 
However, according to Brown, by rejecting Nonoverdetermination, and thus 
overdetermining the effect that mental causes have on physical causes, 
physicalism is weakened to the point of fallibility. Non-reductive physicalism 
espouses the causal closure argument explicitly in order to embrace and bolster 
physicalism, while simultaneously aiming to demonstrate that the causal closure 
argument elides Kim's strategy of reducing the mind down to neural phenomena 
(or other lower-level phenomena).   
The argument for the causal closure argument is, pace Brown and Papineau, 
as follows:  
‘every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause’, mental phenomena have 
physical effects, and physical effects are not systematically overdetermined, so all 
phenomena that causally affect the physical—including mental phenomena—are 
themselves physical.1 So formulated, the exclusion argument and the causal closure 
argument are nearly indistinguishable, save that exclusion targets non-reductive 
physicalism and causal closure targets dualism.120 
As Brown delineates, Kim's “exclusion argument” argues against non-
reductive physicalism by way of the same logic as the causal closure argument, 
which works against dualism. That is, if one, or more, of the claims in the 
exclusion argument are denied, then the physicalist allows for the dualist to 
bypass what often is lauded as the strongest argument for the thesis of physicalism. 
Consider that a non-reductive physicalist wants to deny Nonoverdetermination 
so as to allow that events can be systematically overdetermined by multitudinous 
causes. If we were, accordingly, to deny Nonoverdermination, then the dualist 
could respond that it is “acceptable for physical events to be causally 
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overdetermined by both physical and nonphysical causes.”121 As Brown underscores, 
compatibilism allows for the necessitarian dualist to unerringly claim that causal 
closure is not broken by physical effects, with the dualist’ scheme overdetermined 
by both physical and nonphysical causes.  
CONCLUSION  
The problem Brown sketches out is that Bennett's line of compatibilism is 
something that not only non-reductive physicalists can take up, but also dualists. 
The dualist can, just like the non-reductive physicalist, attempt to attend to the 
“tight modal relationship between higher- and lower-level properties required by 
non-reductive physicalism”, with the dualist can affirm that natural laws are 
metaphysically necessary.122 But the affirmation of natural laws via metaphysical 
necessity does not illuminate what conditions, in other worlds, would have to be 
met for some configuration-based candidate for consciousness. Does this mean 
that we are better to just concede that Commander Data does not feel pain? 
Ought we not designate Commander Data feeling Data, or D-Pain, just as, 
perhaps, the cyborg feels CyborgPain, or C-Pain, while conceding that some 
basic structural representational make-up is shared which allows us to reasonably 
communicate in a given space of reasons?  
If the answer to this question is yes, then we do risk eliding very real 
phenomenal differences for the sake of conceding co-variance in phenomenal 
experiences to a statistically dominant portrait of the scientific image. This might 
this be not only run contrary to the first-person character of phenomenal 
variance but to having a more accurate science. Consider that we are already 
aware of the possibility of color inversion, with Inverted Earth scenarios finding 
a cousin in empirical cases—that is, we have scientific empirical evidence for 
shifted spectra by way of normal color variance and between genders: 
There are a number of [sex-linked] genetic divisions in peak sensitivities in the 
population that are analogous to differences in blood types (in that they are genetic 
polymorphisms, discontinuous genetic differences coding for different types of 
normal perceivers) [.…] These differences in peak sensitivities don’t show up in 
common activities, but they do reveal themselves in subtle experimental situations. 
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One such experimental paradigm uses the anomaloscope (devised in the 19th 
Century by Lord Rayleigh), in which subjects are asked to make two halves of a 
screen match in color, where one half is lit by a mixture of red and green light and 
the other half is lit by yellow or orange light [.…] Whereas one subject may see the 
two sides as the same in color, another subject may see them as different—e. g., 
one redder than the other. When red and green lights are adjusted to match orange, 
women tend to see the men’s matches as too green or too red. Further, variation in 
peak sensitivities of cones is just one kind of color vision variation. In addition, the 
shape of the sensitivity curves vary. These differences are due to differences in 
macular pigmentation, which vary with ‘both age and degree of skin pigmentation’ 
[…] Hence races that differ in skin pigmentation will differ in macular 
pigmentation. There is also considerable variation in amount of light absorption by 
pre-retinal structures. And this factor also varies with age. I emphasize gender, race 
and age to stifle the reaction that one group should be regarded as normal and the 
others as defective. (That would be sexism, racism or ageism.) […] My point is that 
the facts about variation that I have presented give us no reason at all to regard any 
gender, race or age as abnormal in color vision [.…] Assuming that most men and 
women, blacks and whites, old and young have veridical color vision, two 
experiences can have the same representational content but different phenomenal 
character.123 
Although we can restrict ourselves to biochemical neural mechanisms when 
considering the questions of phenomenal consciousness, our best information 
about where in the brain consciousness happens is that every conscious content is 
processed by the brain-area which processes that kind of information. We know 
that conscious contents of motion have to do with the actions in the Medial 
Temporal area of the visual cortex and likely involve reciprocal connections to 
the lower visual area. Similarly, conscious appreciation of faces has to do with 
activation of the fusiform face area in the bottom of the right temporal lobe. Yet 
we have no “place” or unified network for pinning down phenomenal 
consciousness. This need not mean embracing Dennett-style illusionism but 
understanding that P-consciousness is not an intentional property while, 
simultaneously, intentional differences can make a P-conscious difference.124  
P-consciousness is experience, P-conscious properties are experiential 
properties, and P-conscious states are experiential states. Since P-consciousness 
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differences seemingly make an intentional difference, it requires that we point to those 
empirical experiences (tastes, smells, etc.). Thus the challenge arises for the Kantian 
naturalist:  
[A] realist about phenomenal consciousness should not find first-person 
operationalism any more palatable than third-person operationalism. Consider the 
reduction of phenomenal consciousness to reflective consciousness…if phenomenal 
consciousness is reflective consciousness, then for the pain to be phenomenally 
conscious is for there to be a higher-order thought about the pain, or at least some 
sort of cognitive state that scans it.125  
 
Hence, one answer is to concede that P-conscious properties are distinct from 
any functional properties. This means not that their scientific picture should be, 
too, however, and not that the latter should supplant the former. The vagaries yet 
intuitive force of phenomenal-consciousness, and phenomenal experiences, given 
the pervasive nature of qualia-talk in both folk-psychological domains and 
philosophy, indicates that there is something fundamental shared across different 
sapient modalities.  
We ought not to confuse the use of analogical modeling within conceptual-
category construction and theoretical postulation with a metaphysical 
identification between the model and what is postulated on its basis. Sensations 
are modeled on the spatial and qualitative properties attributed to physical 
objects while enjoying counterpart attributes in relation to the latter. The same 
point applies to the objective determinations tracked by alethic modal 
vocabulary, which would be counterpart determinations to the conceptual 
determinations we associate with semantic inferential relations that obtain in “the 
space of reasons.” As Robert Brandom remarks, doting on the implications of 
knowledge-through-inference: 
One conclusion that emerges is that the incompatibility-and- consequence relations 
that articulate the contents of both theoretical and observational concepts must be 
understood to be subjunctively robust. By engaging in inferences tracking those 
relations, experiencing subjects practically confront not only facts, but the lawful 
relations of consequence and incompatibility that make those facts both 
determinate and cognitively accessible. Hegel argues that we can understand the 
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meaning of the categorial concepts that articulate our understanding of the 
structure of the objective world—concepts such as object, property, fact, and law—
only by understanding what we have to do to count as practically taking or treating 
the world as having such structure. What we must do is use singular terms and 
predicates to refer and describe, use declarative sentences to assert and state facts, 
use alethic modal vocabulary to codify laws in the form of inference licenses, and 
use those laws to explain facts.126 
 
If we are not to simply transpose conceptual determinations into the order of 
scientific realism so as to claim that nature is conceptually structured, as idealists 
did, and do, then we must say that the forging of conceptual frameworks and 
theories that make use such alethic modal vocabulary constitute part of a process 
through which reason progressively enhances a cognitive system’s 
representational abilities. This results in our ability grasp nature’s objective modal 
structure. Underlining the diversity of language games, to the autonomy of cultures 
and languages, or to encroachments of anthropocentrism in the wake of 
posthuman intelligence, cannot alleviate this burden. As philosophizing droogs, 
we must make some critical purchase on reality, or at least attempt to. There will 
always be those who underscore the fetishization of reason-giving, the limits of 
cosmologies and world-views but, in response, the pragmatic rationalist offers 
that: 
that our expressions play a suitable role in reasoning is an essential, necessary 
element of our saying, and their meaning, anything at all. Apart from playing such 
a role in justification, inference, criticism, and argument, sentences and other 
locutions would not have the meanings appealed to and played with by all the other 
games we can play with language. We philosophers should be proud to 
acknowledge and affirm our logocentrism, but should also justify it by an account 
of the relations between meaning and use, conceptual content and discursive 
practice.127 
What form do these so-called “rational principles” that philosophers so often 
refer to take? A satisfactory answer is that which Thomas Nagel gives in the 
appropriately titled project, The Last Word (2001); rational principles play a 
 
126 Robert Brandom, A Spirit of Trust (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 23. 
127 Robert Brandom, Between Saying and Doing (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 43. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 356 
foundational role in the inextricable bind between deliberative cognition and 
sapient thought, with the rational understood as that which persists in form. For 
instance, cinema (whether digital or analog) persists in editing, thus its rational 
principle is “cutting,” or the montage, as Sergei Eisenstein understood early on; 
understanding the natural structure of the world persists in the scientific method, 
and such is its form.128  
One cannot affirm or justify the obsolescence of rationality via pragmatic 
contradiction. Global challenges to rationality as a whole cannot but rely on what 
they disavow; those inferential, discursive practices of description, explanation, 
and theorization, which constitute the activity of reasoning. can be superseded or 
revised as a result of criticism and future findings. The enterprise proceeds by the 
operation of methods that aspire to universal validity on empirical information; 
to construct a rational picture of the world mean to construct one with ourselves 
in it, one that makes sense of these data. Empirical particulars cannot overthrow 
general principles but allow us to proffer conceptual content-laden qualifications. 
Rationality is thus not something one can withhold judgment about as one 
interrogates it, since the very act of interrogation implies the justificatory 
practices that constitute the activity of reasoning. Despite we are able to locate 
emergent neural phenomena, at their moment of emergence, our diachronic 
aspiration for concept-formation evinces an intuitive attempt to understand the 
functionality of sapient thought not only in psychological terms but essentially as 
a social and historical collective phenomenon. Recalling Hegel’s apothegm, we 
settle into the resolution that the functionality of sapient thought can be 
understood richly not only in psychological terms, but essentially as a social and 
historical collective phenomenon, in which consciousness not only not only 
represents so as to progressively know an already individuated world and 
subjectivity, by virtue of which agents enter an interactive-dialogical space which 
transforms the world and themselves. 
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